A History of the Ministry of Information, 1939-46
There have been three really bad raids on Southampton, the first during the last hours of Saturday, November 23rd, the second and third at the same time on November 30th and December 1st.
DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES
These three have left Southampton worse damaged than Coventry, according to journalists and others who have visited both places.
Casualties were, however, relatively small. They total about 370, of which probably half were fatal. This was due partly to the large proportion of incendiary bombs used, especially on November 30th, and to the fact that there are comparatively few residents in the business part of the town and around the Civic Centre, where the attack was particularly intense. Also a long apprenticeship to raiding has made the population shelter-conscious. Last Saturday (December 7th), when a repetition of the raiding was apprehended, the streets were deserted after dark.
If the centre of the town is more damaged than the centre of Coventry, some of the outer erections of the town are in a worse plight than the West End of London. Parts of the industrial suburbs, such as Woolston are indeed, almost as badly hit as the centre of the town. The greater part of the damage was due to fire, and the excellence of the fire-fighting service stresses the fact that a concentrated attack by incendiary bombs presents a problem which has yet to be solved. Of that problem the water supply is the most formidable ingredient. Another thing that hampered the Southampton fire-service was the sudden discovery that the junctions of pipes brought in from outside did not always fit local ones.
Damage to important industries was surprisingly small.
THE SERVICES
The services were all affected but in varying degree. The telephone entirely knocked out; the electricity services were only partially compromised; the water supply was badly hit, and, though important repairs were quickly made, portions of the community are still completely without running water or lack an adequate supply; the gas works were seriously damaged and transport was inevitably dislocated; and the municipal offices at the Civic Centre were rendered well-nigh untenable. The worst disability imposed upon those in authority, however, came from the break-down of communication. For some time after the second and third raids contacts were largely a matter of chance.
THE POPULATION
The population was shaken but undismayed. There was no panic or looting. There was considerable evacuation, partly official but mainly spontaneous. The ‘trek’ to the country was pathetic to see, and the quarters found were often inadequate. But it was not a panic movement. Men went mainly to escort their women-folk, and the women often on account of their children. The large majority of the workers were anxious to return by day for their work. With very few exceptions, the personnel of the different services met the emergency effectively. The same cannot be said of all the chief municipal officers. There were cases when good intentions did not produce equally good results.
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION ACTIVITIES
The Regional Commissioner arrived at Southampton early on each Sunday. On both occasions he called a conference morning and afternoon of the appropriate officials. On the first Sunday those conferences were attended by the R.I.O. and on the second Sunday the D.R.I.O. was there as well.
On the first Sunday the R.I.O. did not have much to do, except to manage the press and keep in touch with Reading and London. It was not then considered necessary to use loudspeakers or to introduce other emergency measures.
On the second Sunday it was evident that emergency measures would have to be brought into action, and this was still more the case on the Monday (December 2nd). Our activities can be summarised as follows:
PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT
(1) On arriving on December 1st, the R.I.O. and D.R.I.O. attended the meeting held by the Regional Commissioner of the local officials. After this meeting, a report was drafted by the Regional Commissioner to the Ministry of Home Security in such a way as to ensure the right sort of official bulletin. The press was given the same “ slant”.
(2) Help to local press : The office of the Southampton Daily Echo was pulverised, and the staff proceeded to Bournemouth to bring out the paper in the office of a sister newspaper.
We were able (a) to arrange with the Ministry of Transport for extra petrol for the Echo's delivery vans, (b) to get extra coupons for numbers of the staff to go backwards and forwards from their homes,(o) through Headquarters, to help the Echo continue its P.A. service.
The Echo's emergency arrangements have worked well. It did not miss its Southampton sales a single day.
The national newspapers were also on sale in Southampton all through.
(3) National and Foreign Press . Help of the usual sort was afforded the representatives of the national and foreign press, personally conducted tours, guidance, interviews, etc., etc.
(4) Posters and Notices . We assisted in the preparation of notices issued by the Regional Commissioner, the Mayor, etc. Of these, there were two (a) a proclamation, signed by the Regional Commissioner and the Mayor, asking refugee workers in the country to return to work,(b) a poster giving a time-table of buses and trains for the journey to and fro.
These posters were distributed over a wide rural area and in the appropriate towns by members of the Reading staff using their own cars, by one of our film unit cars and its driver, and by the Home Front Leagues of the New Forest and Winchester and neighbourhood, and, of course, members of the appropriate Local Information Committees.
(5) We also used four loudspeaker vans in this area, in which members of the Reading staff, the Secretary of the New Forest Home Front League and L.I.C., and Mr. Rose of the Southampton L.I.C. were the speakers.
LOCAL INFORMATION COMMITTEES AND HOME FRONT LEAGUES
The Southampton L.I.C. did not function during the emergency. The reason for this is obvious; members, with one exception, whose help would have been useful, were engrossed in the emergency duties which fell to them as members of the community. This perhaps, reveals an 35 - 3 -inevitable weakness of L.I.Cs. in similar circumstances. The member of the Southampton L.I.C. who did function was Mr. Rose. Mr. Rose is the local Labour agent, a member of the A.R.P. Committee and of our Regional Advisory Committee. The value of his assistance to us and, indeed, to the Regional Commissioner's organisation cannot be exaggerated.
The Southampton Home Front League did not function. Its Secretary has become soured by the long delay that there has been in supplying him with promised assistance. This was unfortunate, as it is to the wider Home Front League organisation rather than to the L.I.C. to whom it would appear that we shall have to look for help after intensive air-raiding. The membership of the Home Front Leagues is large enough and broad enough (unlike that of L.I.Cs.) to afford us what ought, with a little organisation, to be useful allies and points of contact.
One thing, in any case, the incident has brought out, namely, that the neighbouring Ministry organisations have a useful role to perform when a centre is badly raided. The Secretaries of our organisations for the New Forest and Winchester and neighbourhood immediately reported. The former, as said above, himself manned a loudspeaker van, and both used part of the Home Front League membership in getting out posters and helping us to reach the refugees.
There is scope for a further organisation of this work.
ASSISTANCE TO REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
We acted and are acting as public relations officer to the Regional Commissioner and to his Deputy, whom the Regional Commissioner left as his representative for as long as the crisis might continue at Southampton. Mr. Gammons spent the greater part of the last week in Southampton, and, thanks to his energy and local knowledge, was on more than one occasion able to be of use to Mr. Bernays in public relations matters. Thus, when trouble with Labour threatened, he called in Mr. Rose, who quelled the rising storm and removed its causes. Mr. Rose has now, in addition to his other duties, taken on that of local Labour adviser to the Regional Commissioner's office.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
It was not necessary for us to exercise all the emergency functions which might fall to us. The uninterrupted arrival of the national and local newspapers, and the fact that the electrical services, and therefore the B.B.C., were not for long comprehensively deranged, rendered an emergency bulletin unnecessary.
Nor did we do all the loudspeaker work that might have fallen to us, as the local police cars dealt with the boiling of drinking water and milk, the necessity of conserving water, etc. The municipal authorities also undertook the posting of notices about the location of emergency Departments, etc.
On the whole, our activities during the Southampton incident were much what we expected them to be. Valuable lessons have, however, emerged from our experiences.
CONCLUSIONS
These conclusions may be roughly summarised as follows:
(1) It is essential to be prepared for a complete breakdown of communications with the outside world and even as between different parts of and activities in the afflicted area. One must, in fact, be prepared for a situation in which none of the ordinary aids to work are forthcoming.
(2) The Ministry's representative must work even more closely with the Regional Commissioner than at the Regional capital. He must not only deal with the press on behalf of the Ministry of Information; he must act as the press officer of the Regional Commissioner, of the other Government Departments, and quite possibly of the City Departments. His duties as public relations officer of the Regional Commissioner also promise to become important.
(3) The appointment of a local journalist (the editor of the weekly paper) as press liaison officer with the local A.R.P. Control is useful, especially at first. During the early days the services of this officer were most useful in establishing connections and in helping to deal with the visiting press.
(4) The Reading office must have in readiness a more elaborate organisation for “blitz” emergencies than we had contemplated.
(5) As part of this organisation, the control of an adequate number of loudspeakers and the cars for them is essential.
We relied, by previous arrangement, upon the Regional Police pool of loudspeaker cars on this occasion. The arrangement was not satisfactory. The police service was tardy and inadequate, and our work among the refugees was hampered thereby.
(6) Local Information Committees in the raid area and their personnel are not likely to be of much use to us.
(7) The Home Front Leagues, with their larger and more widely spread membership, might, on the other hand, be extremely useful.
(8) Neighbouring L.I.Cs. and Home Front Leagues can have a valuable part in our scheme.
The procedure which it seems advisable to follow in the event of other serious air-raiding in the light of the lessons learnt at Southampton is dealt with in a separate report.