SECRET
POLICY COMMITTEE
Thursday, 30th January 1941
Present
:
Minister
D.G.
D.D.G.
Sir Maurice Peterson
Mr. Fraser
Mr. Macgregor
Mr. Harvey
Mr. Leigh Ashton
Mr. Wiltshire
Mr. Ridsdale
Mr. Tree
Mr. Gates
Mr. Ogilvie
Sir Stephen Tallents
Mr. Valentine Williams
Mr. Herbert
Mr. Waddell (Secretary)
1. The minutes of the meeting on 23rd January were taken as read and approved. Arising out of the minutes the Minister asked what progress was being met with the transfer of B.B.C. services from Maida Vale to Bush House. Sir Noel Ashbridge explained that trouble had arisen through delay by the Ministry of Works in building a wall, which had to be partly within and partly outside the part of the building the B.B.C. was to occupy. The Ministry of Works had promised occupation by 13th February, but there could of course be no guarantee that this would be possible. It was explained that should the accommodation at Maida Vale be damaged a transfer to Bush House would be made immediately. Mr. Ogilvie said the B.B.C. would appreciate any assistance the Minister could afford through approaching Lord Reith, and referred to a discussion to take place the same morning which would settle whether the services could be split, some part being left for the time being at Maida Vale and the remainder removing to Bush House. The Minister said he would try to find time to visit Maida Vale in the near future.
[B/12/9]
2.
EXTENSION OF B.B.C’s OVERSEAS SERVICES
[RC/197/1]
[B/102]]
The D.G. explained the origin of the papers which were before the meeting and said that in discussion at the Treasury about the Canadian transmitter project it had appeared that the Treasury would, be willing to grant only some £50,000) for capital expenditure and some £10,000 annually. The B.B.C. would prefer to drop the Canadian transmitter project and push ahead with the wider proposals now before the Committee. His own feeling was that the whole question was a matter of obtaining
391
- 2 -priorities, and that consideration by the Cabinet would be necessary. He thought we should say that we wanted the Canadian transmitter and also the programme of development outlined in the paper.
[RC/197/1]
In reply to question by the Minister it was explained (a) that the developments proposed would if carried out be of great assistance after the war; it was agreed that this point should be made in the main paper (e.g. at the end of paragraph 2) with special reference to the value of broadcasting during the period of armistice; (b) that the progress of the East Coast transmitter was being held up because of Post Office objections to the site at Brookmans Park. The Post Office objections were to be discussed as soon as possible with representatives of all the interested Departments at a meeting of the Additional Transmitters Committee; if this meeting failed to reach agreement it might be necessary to take the matter up on the Ministerial level.
[B/102]
[RC/31/15]
It was agreed that representatives of the Broadcasting Division should see the D.G. and agree with him on the form in which the proposals could best be put to the Treasury in the first place. Preparation of a complete paper giving as much indication as possible of the precise priorities etc. involved would be necessary in due course.
3.
INCLUSION OF ENEMY COMMUNIQUÉS IN GLOBEREUTER SERVICE
The D.G. explained the position that had been reached in consideration of this question by the Joint Standing Committee of the Ministry and Reuters and its Sub-Committee. He summarised the arguments which had been made for inclusion and exclusion of the communiqués. In favour of inclusion Reuters made the point that their news service had been and should continue to be a complete and impartial service; he did not feel that there was very much in the argument on impartiality since it was probably thought throughout the world that since Reuters was the main British agency they were not likely to be allowed to circulate in war-time anything contrary to the policy of the British Government. From the point of view of a news agency, however, there was considerable force in the contention that their service could not be complete unless enemy communiqués were carried.
[RC/170]
In favour of exclusion the argument was that the enemy communiqués represented a concentrated form of German propaganda, and that it was wrong for the main British news agency to give currency and additional weight to this propaganda by circulating it to foreign countries. It was explained in answer to the Minister that British communiqués are not carried by news agencies under enemy control, and Sir Maurice Peterson, Mr. Leigh Ashton and Mr. Ridsdale supported the view that German communiqués should be excluded from our services.
Mr. Wiltshire explained that the Sub-Committee had agreed that there should be no notable omissions from the Reuters service and said that in his own view total exclusion of the communiqués would be a notable omission. Negotiations to introduce Reuters into various parts of the world or support their uncertain position were at present in progress and he felt it would prejudice these negotiations if the quality of the service were impaired, as it would be from the point of view of newspapers in South Africa, Latin America and the Far East. He referred also to the tailpieces which were at present attached to the communiqués, but felt bound to agree that they did not offer a complete solution to the problem. The view that the communiqués should be included was supported by Mr. Fraser and Mr. Valentine Williams. The latter thought that once it was realised that Reuters’ reputation for impartiality could not be sustained newspapers abroad would denounce their contracts. Mr. Wiltshire also referred to a consideration which should be in the mind of the Ministry in reaching a decision (though it had not been brought up by Reuters themselves) that we might be placed in a difficult position at the end of the war unless we did not hinder Reuters in creating for themselves a sound commercial position.
Mr. Ridsdale said conditions were now greatly different from conditions in time of peace and he felt the enemy should not be allowed to use this means of obtaining information by means of rebuttals or undermining morale. His suggestion was that the communiqué ought to be permitted whenever the Service Departments were in a position to issue a substantive story which could if desired include references to the falsity of German claims. Sir Maurice Peterson suggested that German communiqués should be dealt with on the same lines as we now dealt with claims about shipping losses.
[RC/170]
The Minister said he appreciated the force of the arguments which had been put in favour of including the communiqués but he felt that the position in the past and in the future should not be allowed to influence our judgment in the present. He felt that readers were in general convinced that Reuters was an instrument of British propaganda; they were not likely to distinguish carefully the sources from which elements in the Reuters’ service came, and he felt it to be of great importance that no assistance should be afforded to the enemy through letting readers obtain enemy propaganda material through Reuters. He did not think Reuters’ reputation for objectivity could be very strong in war time, and so far as it was strong, it gave added force to the argument for exclusion. He thought the lesser of two evils was to exclude the communiqués and it was agreed that every effort should be made to secure the adoption of this policy by Reuters.
