319

SECRET
POLICY COMMITTEE
1st August 1940

Present:

Mr. Macadam

D.G.

D.S.

P.S.

Sir Maurice Peterson

Sir Kenneth Clark

Mr. Macadam

Mr. Bamford

Mr. Kirkpatrick

P.P.S.

Mr. Gates

Mr. Macgregor

Mr. Wiltshire (Secretary)

Mr. Ogilvie

Mr. J.B. Clark

Sir Stephen Tallents

Sir Noel Ashbridge

Mr. Valentine Williams

Mr. Willert

1. FAMINE IN EUROPE

Mr. Valentine Williams referred to a paper (circulated here-with). He said that he was anxious to obtain the support of the Ministry in making the following points:-

(1) That the British blockade was not directly responsible for the coming hunger in Germany and the existing shortage in occupied territories.

(2) That the false prosperity in Denmark and other occupied countries should be exposed.

(3) That statements on the subject by members of foreign Governments should be coordinated, in particular by the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

There had, moreover, been statements by American broadcasters which cut across our campaign. It was necessary to avoid gloating over the prospect of German starvation. The Minister pointed out that while the present and prospective food conditions could be directly traceable to the Nazi policy of “guns before butter”, it could not be pretended that we were not intensifying the consequences. Mr. Nicolson stated that he and several members of the Ministry had had preliminary discussions with representatives of the Ministry of Economic Warfare dealing with this question, and were now drafting a paper, which would be submitted to the Minister after it had been agreed by the Minister of Economic Warfare. It might then be desirable that a permanent committee should be set up to deal with the matter. It was agreed that Mr. Valentine Williams should have a copy of the paper. Mr. Tree said he thought it important that there should be better coordination of the various bodies in this country concerned in the matter, and instanced as an example that the American branch of the Red Cross had been approached by the British branch suggesting that they should feed the Channel Isles. The American branch had had to inform the British Red Cross that they understood that it was contrary to the policy of the British Government to do so.

1. B.B.C. OVERSEAS ESTIMATES

Mr. Ogilvie explained briefly that the gradually increasing number of transmitters now made it possible to satisfy the requirements of the Empire and foreign countries more satisfactorily. Programmes had been drawn up in close consultation with the branches of the Ministry concerned, and the estimates for these programmes were now under consideration between the B.B.C. and the Ministry. The paper circulated explained very 320 briefly the improvements which would “be possible under the new scheme in respect of “live” programmes as opposed to recorded programmes. After a “brief discussion, the Minister requested that the estimates should “be submitted to him “before finally being put to the Treasury.

3. BROADCASTING ON ENEMY WAVELENGTHS

Sir Noel Ashbridge, referring to certain questions which had been asked at the previous meeting, said that the best wavelength for the purpose would “be the long wave on which Deutschlandsender was emitted, but even this would cover only about 1/5 of the listening population of Germany. There was only one station which could be made suitable for this purpose [illegible] (i.e. the old Droitwich station), and the necessary conversion would take about one week. Broadcasting oh the long wave from an aeroplane was technically possible. The maximum strength[illegible]t appeared to be about 1 kilowatt, and this would have a normal range of about 20 to 30 miles and an outside range of 50 miles. Broadcasting for any length of time from such an aeroplane would make it a very easy target for aircraft or anti-aircraft guns controlled by direction finding. We would, moreover, be at a hopeless disadvantage from the point of view of reprisals. Although these objections were strong, they were not so strong that coming up on enemy wavelengths should be entirely ruled out as a method to be adopted in exceptional circumstances or on one particular occasion.

4. PROPOSAL FOR A NORWEGIAN NEWSPAPER

Mr. Kirkpatrick referred to a proposal by the Norwegians that they should have a paper with a circulation of 4,000 and containing about 8 pages, to be issued once or twice a week, for which they themselves would pay. The Committee agreed that the proposal should be supported with the necessary paper in the first instance for a period of eight weeks.

5. JOINT SERVICE COMMUNIQUÉ

Mr. Kirkpatrick reported that he had had a discussion on the question of a joint communiqué issued by the three Services. It had been decided to recommend to the Chiefs of Staffs Sub Committee that such a communiqué should be issued and that officers from the three Service Departments should meet at the Ministry of Information once a day, armed with the necessary material, to draw up a joint communiqué. This would not prevent each of the Services from issuing an independent communiqué if they wished.

6. 1 MINUTE'S SILENCE

Mr. Ogilvie reported a slight increase of pressure on this subject; Lord Elton was promoting a movement in the House of Lords similar to that which had been in evidence in the House of Commons. He asked whether the Minister would have any objection to his speaking to Members of Parliament, if asked. The Minister agreed and observed that he had sent a letter the day before to Major Carver, who had organised the memorial sent by 50 or 60 Members of the House, passing on to him the objections which the B.B.C. felt to the proposal.