[August 9th 1940]
NOTE ON COUNTER-PROPAGANDA NECESSARY TO MEET THE CHARGE THAT WE ARE “STARVING EUROPE”.

It is probable that during the coming winter there will be a shortage of foodstuffs and raw materials in several areas of Europe. There will also be an accumulation of unexportable commodities in the United States, Latin America and Russia. Our enemies will attribute this to the extension of our blockade and will represent us as starving Europe and ruining the Americas. In the United States we are likely to be faced with an alliance between the humanitarians and the vested interests clamouring to send food to territories in enemy occupation. Russia, who is anxious to obtain machinery from France, may also exercise strong pressure. And the several Allied Governments now in exile (the Dutch, Belgians, Poles, etc. and even General de Gaulle) may agitate for schemes to relieve the sufferings of their compatriots. How are we to meet this difficulty?

It is suggested that we should consider both a short-term and a long-term policy.

The short-term policy would be as follows:-

(1) Make full use of recent German boasts that they do not anticipate any food shortage.

(2) Bring evidence to prove that the Germans are already looting occupied territory.

(3) Germany's real difficulty is proved by her action to be the breakdown of the much vaunted Nazi economic methods.

(4) Repeat again and again that food sent to German occupied territory enables Germany to prolong the war.

(5) Create a small informal committee to discuss the problem with representatives of the exiled Governments. Mr. Hugh Gibson, who fully appreciates the difficulty, could attend this committee and explain to our Allies the point of view of the U.S. Administration.

This short-term policy is negative and defensive. Our long-term policy should he far more positive and delivered in the form of an attack along the whole front. The following directives are suggested:-

(1) The food shortage in Europe is mainly due to the fact that the Hitlerian system is based upon fundamentally wrong principles.

(2) In the first place he has misunderstood the true nature of personal relationships in that he has substituted compulsion for consent. More specifically he has destroyed the free contractual relationships between man and man, town and country, nation and nation.

(3) In the second place he has misunderstood the problem of distribution. Unless he is able to secure cheap sea-transport for the bulk supplies which he now controls he will be unable to distribute the resources under his command.

These two errors on his part offer us a rich field for propaganda offensive

(1) In order to obtain food Hitler will have to collect the small surpluses of millions of peasants. If we are able to inculcate into the agricultural population of Europe a fear of privation, a fear of inflation and a desire for non-cooperation, then Hitler's administrative problem will become truly formidable and the difficulty of repressing agrarian sabotage over such vast areas will exhaust his resources and energies.

(2) In order to distribute food he will have to rely mainly upon land and river transport. No effort should be spared to render sea transport impossible and to interfere with his railways and water-ways, Intensive propaganda should be launched to suggest that his distribute system is breaking down. We should seek to shift the emphasis from the efficiency of our blockade to the inefficiency of Hitler's system of distribution.

Having by these means undermined confidence in Hitler's system, we must, by taking the initiative wherever possible, build up confidence in our own. At this point the interests of our commerce, political policy and propaganda coincide. We and the United States are both being 110 - 3 -compelled by the pressure of events to pay considerable attention to the problem of surpluses, largely foodstuffs, which are rising in the Colonial Empires, the Dominions, parts of the U.S.A. and South America. Some of these can be stored relatively cheaply.

Whatever form the ultimate reconstruction of Europe may take, the first essential after fighting ceases will be to prevent the deterioration of political conditions by any prolongation of civilian suffering. To achieve this purpose it may well become necessary to have ready to hand an organisation capable of dealing promptly and efficiently with what is likely to be a very pressing problem of civilian relief. The enthusiasms and abilities of a number of American citizens might well now be harnessed to this task and preliminary investigation and discussion set on foot in order to determine the outline of an organisation, possibly an inter-Allied and international Commission, which will be needed for this purpose. Problems of shipping, distribution, supervision and similar matters might well be given preliminary examination.

It is for consideration whether the exploration of this proposed scheme should first be undertaken unofficially by a small but strong private inter-Allied group, including possibly a man like Mr. Gibson, or whether an official investigation should be set on foot. In any event, it will not be possible to ask H.M.G. to commit itself to any such undertaking until financial and related considerations have been fully explored. Some of these matters are outside the competence of M.E.W. or M.O.I. We should create a strong International Commission, prepared, at any given moment, to send food-stuffs to any given locality. We should let it be known that rich food-supplies are ready and waiting to be delivered to any European country, or section of that country, which is able to free itself from Gorman domination. Our blockade by such means could gradually be rendered both a menace and a bribe.