This memorandum is circulated to members of the Policy Committee for discussion on Thursday, 22nd August. It represents a joint record of a meeting held between members of this Ministry and members of the Ministry of Economic Warfare in the hope of establishing some agreed line in dealing with the German statements that we are starving Europe.
JOINT MEMORANDUM ON PUBLICITY ABOUT THE
FOOD SITUATION IN EUROPE.
At a meeting held on August 19th at the Ministry of Economic Warfare and attended by representatives of that Ministry and of the Ministry of Information, including Mr. Dingle Foot M.P., and the Hon. Harold Nicolson M.P., it was decided to submit the following joint memorandum to the Ministers of Economic Warfare and of Information. It sets out the aims and. methods to be pursued in presenting to U.S. opinion the official point of view about the food situation in German-controlled Europe during the coming winter, and deals more particularly with the direct handling of news items by the Press Section of M.E.W. It was further decided that this joint memorandum should be submitted by Mr. Harold Nicolson to the Director of the B.B.C., who should communicate its conclusions throughout all departments of the B. B.C. for guidance.
A. THE SITUATION.
The Germans claim that there are ample supplies of food available in Europe and that there need be no famine. On the assumption that their own figures for reserves of bread grains at the end of June, 1940, (7,000,000 tons) are correct, and that reserves elsewhere in Europe at the same date amounted to 3,000,000 tons and, on the further assumption that the Germans will impose on the whole of German-Europe the appropriate agricultural and civilian rationing policies, this German claim may be accepted as formally correct.
On the basis of the lowest of the three estimates which we have made of European harvests this season, and on the assumption that throughout German-controlled Europe potatoes and grains fit for human consumption will not be fed to livestock, a number of calories per head of the population sufficient to sustain life can be provided until the harvest of 1941 is collected. As the actual yield of this year's harvest will probably be appreciably higher than the lowest estimate, the number of calories available per head will be pro tanto increased.
Further, condensed and dried milk, suitable for children, is produced in large quantities in the Netherlands, and in smaller quantities in Switzerland, Germany and France. Most of this product was imported into the U.K. before the war, and is now all available for consumption in the enslaved area.
The crucial difficulty is, therefore, much more one of transport, civil administration and of basic German policy than of absolute shortage. If the German stocks are to be preserved as a war reserve for the Herrenvolk, then the subject populations will go short. If oil is to be used for military purposes, and civilian transportation restricted, the food available will not sufficiently and equitably distributed. If the productive policy of the whole of European agriculture and the loyalty of its producers is not secured, supplies will begin to fall short in the second half of the inter-harvest period 1940/41.
It is virtually certain that the Germans, ever if they try, will fail to solve the many technical and administrative difficulties which must be overcome if this year's harvest and present reserves are to be distributed so as to prevent localised famine or privation during the coming year. It is, indeed, improbable that the Germans will really try to do so. The political importance to the Nazi regime of maintaining, if not increasing, the present level of rations in Greater Germany, will almost certainly compel them to take more than their fair share of the total supplies available to German Europe. The position that now exists in Poland may be reproduced elsewhere - two rationing schemes, one for Germans and the other for Poles.
B.
OUR POLICY
.
The present policy of H.M.G. is to blockade enemy and enemy occupied territories, including “unoccupied” France, and to prevent the entry into this Enslaved Area of any goods which would aid the enemy in his war effort. Such goods, of course, include foodstuffs. The continuance of this policy is to be subject to review if the situation changes.
C.
PROPAGANDA FROM THE U.S.
We have already seen the beginning of a propaganda campaign in the U.S. in favour of the supply of long-scale American relief to the civilian populations of the occupied Territories. This campaign will certainly grow and will be supported by (1) misguided humanitarians, (2) certain exporting interests, (3) leading American statesmen who are out of jobs and are seeking the limelight (4) German propagandists (5) certain sections of Catholic opinion and (6) the extreme isolationists.
D.
THE IMPRESSION WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK TO CONVEY.
Stated in very general terms, our argument must be that there are sufficient present and prospective supplies of basic foods in Europe to prevent serious privation, provided that the Nazi Government organise distribution properly and refrain from the exploitation of occupied and indirectly controlled territories in order to maintain or increase the rations of the Germans themselves. (incidentally very similar conclusions are reached in a report by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the full text of which is not yet available).
Autumn, when all the harvests have just been gathered in, is the last season of the year when there should be any talk of famine. And if there is any such talk, it is solely due to the deliberate Nazi policy of “Guns before Butter” and to maldistribution by the Germans themselves.
We have yet a further line of defence, namely to say that if we did allow food into German-occupied or German controlled territories, the Germans would either get hold of it themselves or would at any rate indirectly profit through the freeing of equivalent stocks. If we are specifically tackled about unoccupied France, we can point out that there is very little distinction in practice between occupied and unoccupied France and that the attitude of the people of, say, Holland and Poland under German occupation entitles them to at least as much consideration as unoccupied France under the Petain Government.
E.
TACTICS IN THE HANDLING OF NEWS
We want, so far as we can, to avoid the impression that we are conducting propaganda. We therefore do not want either (1) to start a publicity campaign at home (this has been agreed with the Planning Committee of the Ministry of Information, who will neither stifle nor stimulate discussion in this country) or (2) to force our interpretation of the situation on American correspondents in London. It is much better
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- 3 -to let the latter come to us of their own accord. This they are beginning to do quite satisfactorily and, so far as can be judged at present, they are being most helpful.
Besides giving stories direct to American correspondents, there is a second way of getting at AMERICAN opinion by encouraging the publication here and there in the British press of articles by leading British journalists. These can be so written as to avoid giving the impression of direct official inspiration, and they will serve our purpose by being quoted in despatches by U.S. Correspondents in London to their papers in America, and by stimulating American correspondents to continue coming to us for stories.
So far, we have not done much more than state the situation in general terms on the lines described in section D above. What we must now do is to fill in the outline with news items. In doing this, we should leave the moral to be inferred, rather than state it ourselves. We should not protest too much and the effective presentation of detailed news items will now do more to make our case look solid than any amount of general argument. For the moment the possibility is excluded of a declaration by the Government that we will not only permit, but will actively arrange in advance for the entry of food into any part of the Enslaved Area, when this part at least has been wholly cleared of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom. When the time comes to make this declaration, it will help us more than anything else to spike Mr. Hoover's guns. Meanwhile other methods must be found.
The following are the main headings under which we should look for news items:
(1) German and Italian assertions that food resources are abundant.
(2) Impartial reports indicating good harvests and production of foodstuffs.
(3) Evidence of unnatural plenty in Germany, e.g. increased rations.
(4) German looting in occupied territories.
(5) Financial exploitation of occupied territories.
(6) Increasingly stringent rationing in occupied territories.
(7) Export of food from occupied territories to neutral destinations.
(8) Conversion of foodstuffs into war material.
(9) The breakdown in material and human terms of the Nazi economic organisation and administration.
(10) American reactions to food problems, on which immediate comment might be issued by British Journalists for quotation in America.
(11) Exploitation of Germany's alleged “blockade of Britain”.
We do not want anything to be issued at present which bears the stamp of an official statement. On the other hand, public opinion should be prepared through occasional articles by well-known Journalists or preferably by editorial comment in newspapers. General talks broadcast from time to time by the B.B.C. would also be of great value.
From the Parliamentary Secretary
to 1. Sir Frederick Whyte.
2. Mr. Kirkpatrick.
3. The Director General.
4. The Minister.
[[illegible]]
Copy to Mr. Wiltshire.
On August 9th the Policy Committee considered the question of propaganda arising out of the Starvation of Europe campaign. They had before them the provisional Minute I had written in consultation with M.E.W. and it was decided that I should go and see the Officers of M.E.W. and should prepare a further paper for agreement between them and the Foreign Office.
I have discussed this matter with M.E.W. today and have explained to them that what we require is not merely material but also directives for propaganda. If they will tell us what they want us to say to various countries we shall do our best to carry out their instructions. What I was afraid of was that everybody was making different remarks on this matter and that unless we were pretty careful there would be a muddle somewhere. Hitherto we have been very fortunate. Our own press handled the question extremely well and last night there had been a broadcast on the French programme to France which was a model of the sort of propaganda which should be made to Starvation countries. I had a feeling, however, that the whole business was rather uncoordinated and did not quite like going ahead further without a definite written note from M.E.W. which had been seen by their Minister and which I could show to my Minister and which would provide us with a definite programme on which to work.
Mr. Dingle Foot promised me that he would have such a paper prepared in his Department and would like to discuss it with Sir Frederick Whyte, Mr. Kirkpatrick and myself on Wednesday next, August 19th. That is the date after the Prime Minister is himself expected to make a statement on the subject.
When we get that paper we will have to circulate it to the Policy Committee for approval and then pass it to the heads of Divisions.
I may mention as an instance of bad liaison in this matter that the Ministry of Health appear to have accepted offers from the United States for various shiploads of relief provisions for this country. Obviously if one Department is going to accept charity from the United States while other Departments are
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-2-refusing to allow the United States to extend their charity to countries where there in a real shortage we are drifting into a most illogical position.
