A History of the Ministry of Information, 1939-46

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CONCLUSION

The foregoing do not by any means exhaust the methods that can be used to heighten public anger against Germany.

They indicate, however, the comprehensiveness of the possible attack.

The success of such a campaign depends on the day by day control by a small group of expert propagandists, within the Ministry, who would be in a position to tap and colour and guide every source of public expression.

Expressed in terms of ordinary paid-for publicity such a group given adequate powers could secure propaganda that would normally cost millions of pounds.

Without such guidance and control of the “hidden” types of propaganda the obvious methods of official pronouncement - posters, radio, advertisements, leaflets - will be infinitely less effective.

No attempt has been made at this stage either to submit definite suggestions for wording or designs or to indicate a time-table for the operation of the campaign.

That is the next stage if the general plan of attack outlined here is approved.

Finally, it may be said that this campaign, termed an Anger Campaign, is felt to be an integral part of a still larger scheme of public influence - i.e. War Morale as a whole. In this, other factors beside the heightening of anger would also play a part and would be handled on similarly comprehensive or “total propaganda” lines. Everything in the present campaign would be a logical part of such a complete Morale Campaign, the importance of which, to meet the stern time ahead, is very strongly stressed.

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