338 340 -3-

POLICY COMMITTEE
Thursday, 5th September, 1940

Present :

Minister

Director-General

Deputy Director-General

Colonel Scorgie

Sir Maurice Peterson

Mr. Ivor Fraser

Sir Kenneth Clark

Mr. Nicolson

Lord Davidson

Mr. Macadam

Mr. Bamford

Mr. Wellington

Mr. Leigh Ashton

Mr. Hodson

Mr. Tree

Mr. Gates

Mr. Ogilvie

Sir Noel Ashbridge

Sir Campbell Stuart

Mr. Shaw

Mr. Barman

Mr. Wiltshire

Mr. Waddell

(Secretaries)

1. CANADIAN TRANSMITTER

The paper circulated was discussed and Mr. Ogilvie outlined the B.B.C. proposal as it had been set out in his letter to the Director-General of 28th August. The B.B.C. did not wish to staff, maintain and operate a transmitting station in Canada, but would prefer to hire time on a Canadian station, with a possible option on a further part of the time. Although previously intended as an insurance in the event of Daventry failing, it would be desirable to keep the arrangement open by running a small programme with a nucleus staff before that event.

Sir Campbell Stuart observed that he had discussed the subject with the Prime Minister of Canada on the former basis; if it was now desired to take up the latter proposal, he would be ready, if desired, to use his influence with prominent Canadians to assist.

It was noted that the proposal put to the Dominions Office by Sir Kenneth Lee was for complete control and ownership by this country. The alternative proposal, although mentioned to the Dominions Office, had not been officially put to then.

Reference was made to the purchase of the 50 kilowatt transmitter from the R.C.A. which had been carried out this week, and Sir Noel Ashbridge explained that in his view this would be a very useful acquisition. It did not, however, come up to the requirements for Canada, since one transmitter would not give a 24-hours service of news at convenient listening hours. The full scheme for Canada would call for four transmitters, but it would be helpful to have this 50 kilowatt transmitter already built, since the other 339 -2-three were not yet in existence. It was noted that the cost of the 50 kilowatt transmitter was to be in the region of £136,000 and not £50,000 as had been stated in the paper.

Lord Davidson referred to the interest of the Board of Trade in short-wave transmission and the continuance of it after the end of the war. It was agreed that he might consult the Board of Trade, with our views in mind, and should let us know whether the Board of Trade wished to make any representations. It was agreed that in approaches to the Canadian Government it would probably be undesirable to make any reference to a possible continuance of the United Kingdom's interest in the station after the war.

It was agreed that Colonel Scorgie should, in consultation with the B.B.C. and if necessary with Lord Davidson, prepare a paper for the Treasury. The minimum requirements would be as described by the B.B.C. viz. such arrangements with the Canadian Government as would result in the establishment of a short-wave station on which the British Government would have six hours per day programme time. It would be necessary to explain to the Treasury that it was so essential to have the reserve broadcasting facilities that, even were the Canadian Government to refuse to contribute, we should still have power to bear the whole cost, say £300,000. It would be our business to reach the most economical arrangement covering our needs between these limits.

2. PRODUCTION OF NEWSREELS IN CAIRO.

On the proposal of the Director-General it was agreed that the paper circulated should be put to the Treasury. D. G. would be inclined to say that our approval for the scheme should be qualified by the imposition of a time limit and by sending someone out to Cairo to look at the situation on the spot.

Mr. Hodson referred to opposition on the part of the Foreign Office and other Departments to the Cairo Bureau (see Policy Committee minutes of 10th July) which had been encountered. It was noted that any Bureau would be set up with the Ambassador's approval and under the Ambassador's control, and it was agreed that the matter should be pursued and a meeting held with the parties affected.

3. N.B.B.S.

D.G. gave some account of the line taken in the broadcasts referred to in Lord Swinton's letter to Colonel Scorgie. Colonel Scorgie explained that on the previous occasion (see Policy Committee minutes of 2nd and 4th July) when we had been pressed to take strong action to counter the New British Broadcasting Station Propaganda, we had been reluctant to do so because -

(a) we should merely advertise the station

(b) we gathered its chief purpose was to inform enemy agents about the lines they should follow, and there was no evidence that we should be able to prevent listening by the enemy agents concerned.

(c) to take too much notice of the propaganda put out would suggest that we were afraid of the broadcasts, and in the result there might be an increase in the number of enemy stations broadcasting to this country.

It did not appear that any evidence had been found to show either that the station was being widely listened to or that its instructions were being followed to any noticeable extent. In connection with the latter point, Mr. Macadam mentioned that at a meeting of the Security Intelligence Centre the previous evening, the Intelligence Officers present had said there was no evidence of instructions being followed except so far as the existence of chain letters could be attributed to German propaganda. The press, however, acting on guidance agreed upon at a Duty Room meeting had very successfully damped down any discussion of chain letters.

The Minister said that in his view, which was fully endorsed by those present at the meeting, the less said about the station the better. We should be willing to take active measures if any evidence were adduced showing the effectiveness of N.B.B.S. propaganda. It was agreed that Colonel Scorgie should write to Lord Swinton, basing his letter on the lines of the discussion.