REPORT OF PLANNING COMMITTEE ON A HOME MORALE CAMPAIGN

The chief weakness of home morale is a feeling that although we may manage to hold out for a time, we cannot hope to win.

Our chief aim must, therefore, be to give people a reasonable assurance of ultimate victory. The line should be: a German invasion is doomed to failure. Even if the Germans succeed in landing a small force on our shores it will be annihilated by the largest army we have ever had in this island. Meanwhile, our supplies are piling up. The resources of the Dominions and America are limitless. In a few months the increase in our arms and air-force will be so great that we shall be able to hit the Germans back with a force which they, with their diminishing resources, will not be able to withstand. We should continue to stress the part of the Dominions in sending us men and supplies. In this connection we can point out the effects of economic warfare on Germany and her conquered neighbours, although from the point of morale this is less encouraging than more spectacular forms of attack.

The first aim cannot be dissociated from a second: to maintain confidence in the authority and efficiency of the Government. This can only be done if the Government will recognise that the people wish to be given orders. Exhortations are useless without commands; commands are useless without organisation. The Committee has asked representatives of the relevant Government Departments how the public desire for service and sacrifice can be made use of; but it seems that little can be done without agreement between the Ministers responsible for the War Office, Home Security, Labour and Supply. We understand that compulsory measures are being adopted for the collection of salvage; and that Home Security might consider favourably a scheme for compulsory training in A.R.P. , and we strongly urge that similar measures of compulsion be taken for training defence, helping agriculture, promoting physical fitness, etc.

Complementary to (l) is the feeling, not widely expressed but of considerable importance, that a negotiated peace with Germany would be preferable to a prolongation of the war. This is held by the bottom 10% (“We'll be no worse off under Hitler; it’s the bosses he's after”), but this section can probably not be affected by propaganda. It is also latent in a large section of the middle class (“Let's make peace and get done with it”), and the top 10% who hope to save their futures. We must, therefore, show that until we have conquered Germany any truce would be equivalent to surrender. We must continually remind people that Hitler's method is to lull them with promises of relative security and then to destroy them when they are weakened; and we must keep before their minds the examples of Czechoslovakia and Poland to show the meaning of surrender to Germany, conditional or unconditional.

This negative horror at the idea of German rule must be supplemented by pride in our own country. Patriotic appeals have lost some of their force; but even so, the simpler forms of patriotism have not been used enough in this war. Too much stress has been laid on abstractions like Liberty and Democracy, not enough on things that people can see and hear - flags, brass bands, marching soldiers; the countryside, the home and garden. We should not feel ashamed of our pride in our families, homes, towns or counties, which we are now called on to defend.

This simple emotion should be accompanied by indignation that the Germans are threatening all we value. It is unfortunately necessary to increase the intensity of the personal anger against Germany. All sections of the public must be made to realise that for the second time their peaceful lives are being dislocated or destroyed. This must be brought home to each section individually - the professional classes must be made angry at its interruption of civilised progress, women at the threat to their homes, trade unionists at the threat to their hard-won liberties, tradesmen at the threat to their businesses. POLICY COMMITTEE.