Memorandum by Sir Orme Sargent, dated 28th February 1940, with comments by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Lord Halifax, and the Prime Minister.
Sir A. Cadagon
The Prime Minister, in his speech on the 24th, went out his way on two occasions to refer, as one of our war aims, to t[illegible] maintenance of close co-operation between this country and France. The two passages are as follows:-
“Every Frenchman with whom I talked laid stress on this friendship with pride and pleasure. There could be no more hopeful assurance for our common victory, and no more fruitful basis of a lasting peace because this intimate understanding which has grown up between us must not be allowed to come to an end when the war is over. It must remain to help us to work out the problems of the new Europe which must come after the war in an association in which we shall gladly welcome others who share our ideals .............................................
“We and France are determined to do what we can for security by the continuance of that complete identity of purpose and policy which now unites us and which will serve after the war for the firm foundation on which the international relations between our two countries are built. Only so can we establish the authority and stability which are necessary for the security of Europe during the period of reconstruction and fresh endeavour to which we look forward after the war.”
Unfortunately the press have paid practically no attention to this very important element in the Prime Minister's speech. The “Times” on Monday made a passing reference to it but the “Sunday Times” and the “Observer” ignored it altogether. This seems a great pity, since there can be no doubt as to the great importance of the British public being brought to realise that a permanent system of close co-operation with France is the contribution which we must be ready to make in the interests of a stable peace after the war. And by “co-operation” I do not merely mean a political alliance, but the continuance and reinforcement of that unity of action and those special forms of joint executive machinery which have now been established for war purposes not merely in the military and diplomatic fields, but also in the whole domain of finance, trade, and economics generally.
In his speech the Prime Minister laid down that we “must have tangible evidence to satisfy us that pledges or “assurances when they are given will be fulfilled”. I am convinced that if we are to prevent the French from insisting that this tangible evidence shall take the form of a permanent occupation of German territory, the only means by which we can do so will be by assuring them betimes that after the war they will be able,
as an alternative
, to count on such a system of close and permanent co-operation between France and Great Britain - political, military, and economic - as will for all international purposes make of the two countries a single unit in postwar Europe. Such a unit would constitute an effective - possibly the only effective - counter-weight to the unit of 80 million Germans in the middle of Europe; and it is because the French are already alive to this fact that they are already attaching so much importance to the Question of the postwar relationship between Great Britain and France. For they dread the return, once the present danger is past of those centrifugal forces which played such havoc with Anglo- French co-operation after the last war. If, therefore, we can convince the French public that we really mean to work for postwar
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- 2 -unity of action, it ought not to be impossible to persuade them that the co-operation which we are prepared to offer them would constitute a far surer and more lasting guarantee than any occupation of German territory, which is what they will otherwise certainly press for - much to our embarrassment.
At present, however, the British public is quite unprepared for such a development. And it never occurs to it that the pleasing occupation of planning peace terms and war aims need involve the question of setting up a permanent system of Anglo-French unity such as would at first sight appear to most as an alarming and dangerous surrender of Great Britain's liberty of action or maybe even of sovereignty. The idea of the Federation of Europe can make its appeal to public sentiment so long as it appears only as a vague Eldorado about the details of which we need not bother our heads at present. But the application of this idea of federation to the concrete case of Great Britain and France is quite another matter and it will need a considerable amount of education before the British public will get accustomed to the notion of their having to make this unpalatable and unprecedented sacrifice on the altar of European peace. For this reason I would urge that this process of education should be undertaken without delay, for the question of peace terms may at any moment become immediate and we must not be caught unprepared. The Prime Minister has given the lead, and it now lies with the Ministry of Information to popularise the idea and, with the constitutional and administrative experts, to bend their minds to the study of the various forms that this postwar Union of France and Great Britain might conceivably take, and. the different processes by which it might be achieved and developed and consolidated.
(Signed) O.G. Sargent
February 28th, 1940.
I entirely agree. And in the first place Ministry of Information should do what they can in the matter.
Which exactly is the body that should plan the postwar union, I am not quite sure. It might be desirable to set up a special body, or there may be some existing body that can do it.
(Signed) A. Cadogan)
February 29th, 1940.
Prime Minister
Unless you see objection, I propose to get the Ministry of Information to do what they can to get what you said across.
I don't think Sir O. Sargent in any way exaggerates its importance. And I will take steps to get the implications - or some of them - considered.
(Signed) Halifax)
February 29th, 1940.
I entirely agree with this memorandum and shall be glad if the Minister of Information can do something to draw attention to the importance of the subject.
