Mr. Ogilvie reported that the names suggested by us were being considered. The development most desired by the B.B.C. was that Cabinet Ministers should speak often. Next in importance was periodical talks by authoritative military speakers. Third in importance was facilities for men of the Services actually engaged in fighting to come to the microphone, anonymously or not. The present position with regard to the two last was unsatisfactory. Admired Summerville and Sir Hugh Elles had said they were unable to continue and it was apparent that high officers of the Services, although not unwilling in principle to broadcast, would not do so unless they felt they had the backing of the Cabinet. Facilities for interviews with men who had been recently engaged in operations were very uncertain and depended on the personal views of Commanding officers. Mr. Ryan asked for Army instruction from the top, pointing out that it was a duty to provide a flow of men for broadcasting.
[See W.P(C) 40) 138]
The Director General pointed out that this was one aspect of our general difficulties with the Services and it would not be wise to pay attention to the B.B.C. at the expense of the Press. Mr. Welling pointed out that interviews with eye-witnesses etc. were a more essential part of material for broadcasting than for the Press, which could make use of communiqués with background material which had been prepared for reading more effectively than the B.B.C. It was also noted that better broadcasting facilities would help with the American situation.
It was finally decided that a memorandum should be prepared for the Minister, suitable for sending to the three Service departments or to the War Cabinet, making very clear what precisely we required in way of improved facilities for broadcasting, Press, films, and photographs. The paper should be ready by tomorrow evening.
[See [illegible]]
In the meantime the Minister agreed to ask all Ministers to speak as often as possible.
2.
JAMMING.
The Director General reported that he had heard that the Italian medium wave bulletin from Antibes was heard in certain parts of Italy. Sir Noel Ashbridge said that this would depend on the situation of the listener, but his information was that both short and medium waves were being jammed locally by small stations. This was possible even with medium waves. It was noted that Italian bulletins were now also being put out from Cairo.
It was decided not to raise the general policy of jamming at the present time.
[illegible]
SUB-EDITORS FOR THE B.B.C. NEWS BULLETINS
.
The B.B.C. had receiver makes from the Ministry of information. Three posts were now outstanding. The B.B.C. point out that the posts were highly important, since the sub-editors are responsible for the success of the bulletins in their particular languages. There was great competition for this type of man. The work was so strenuous that an elderly man might not be able to stand it. They endeavoured to train on younger men but the difficulty of filling these posts had not yet been solved.
4.
OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS.
The Deputy Secretary reported that the new arrangement had been brought into force as from 7 a.m. bulletin on Saturday. No difficulties had been reported. With regard to the procedure to be adopted in order to broadcast a warning by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, in the event of parachute landings, there were satisfactory provisional working arrangements. The B.B.C. pointed out two outstanding points in which precision was required:
(i) It was understood that if the Commander-in-Chief gave an order to broadcast a warning, this would take priority of an order from the Fighter Command to cease broadcasting for security reasons.
[
W.P.(C)(40) 138
BBC relations with M.O.I.]
(ii) Has the Ministry of Information precedence over Fighter Command in ordering the B.B.C. to broadcast.
Under document ‘C’ the B.B.C. Were to open up for periods not exceeding two minutes at irregular intervals, not more frequently than twice an hour, on an order from the War Cabinet Room. The War Cabinet Room organisation was now obsolete and it was not clear what [illegible] it for this purpose. It was finally decided that the B.B.C. should work to the following order of priority:
(i) C.-in-C., Home Forces.
(ii) Fighter Command.
(iii) Ministry of Information
It was agreed that a statement should be prepared for the Cabinet, making this point clear and in the meantime Mr. Tree undertook to issue the necessary instructions for the Duty Room.
5.
POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY BROADCASTS
.
If all wireless stations have to be closed down simultaneously for security reasons, it would be possible for the enemy to broadcast fake messages on the same wave lengths. The difficultly would be to identify what station came on the air after a wireless silence. This possibility was regarded as constituting a serious danger. It raised the issue - under what conditions the possibility of fake messages should be regarded as more serious than the danger of direction finding by enemy aircraft. The Minister was prepared to issue a warning in general terms in a broadcast. It was agreed that the Deputy Secretary, in conjunction with B.B.C. and representatives of the Service Departments, should consider what recommendation we should make and report forthwith to the Minister.
[W.P(C)(40) 136 BBC relations with M.O.I.]
6.
MR. HULTON'S PROPASALS
.
Sir Kenneth Clark reported that the discussion had now terminated; Mr. Hulton was satisfied, and the Chancellor had written to the Minister.
