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L.R.
JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE OF REUTERS AND THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

Draft Minutes of a meeting of the Sub-Committee on Monday, 27th. January, 1941.

Present:

Mr. Wiltshire (in the Chair)

Mr. Ridsdale.

Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Waddell.

Mr. Hodson.

Mr. Leigh Ashton.

Sir John Pratt

Mr. Moloney.

Mr. Timberlake. (Secretary).

It was agreed that the Minister's statement in the House of Commons regarding the reproduction of German broadcasts contained no ruling on the inclusion of enemy communiqués in a British news service sent abroad; but Sir John Pratt expressed the view that their exclusion would tend to discredit an Agency claiming to supply a world service.

Mr. Ridsdale referred to the Paper which was before the meeting and said that although examples were given there of places which had demanded the inclusion of enemy communiqués in Reuters service there were others which had raised objections. The German communiqués were issued with the dual object of eliciting information and demoralising the public by spreading false claims. The latter consideration applied particularly to neutral peoples, and he thought that on the whole there was a strong case for the exclusion of the communiqués from a news service going abroad.

Mr. Moloney said that mere exclusion from the Globereuter service would have no effect on the publication if the communiqués in the press of the countries concerned, since if Reuters stopped carrying them the newspapers would immediately turn to other sources. The only difference would be that instead of taking the communiqués from Reuter, surrounded with the proposed “neutralising material”, these papers would take them from neutral agencies or from the German wireless, perhaps with other items of enemy news. People would still read the communiqués, but interpret Reuters’ silence in the worst possible way.

Mr. Ridsdale pointed out that a certain amount of Reuter wordage would none the less have been saved, which could be put to other uses.

Mr. Stevens said that experience had shown the question of prompt rebuttal of German claims was a very difficult one. As a compromise he suggested that the enemy communiqués should be written up in connection with other military news available at the time, provided the time-lag could be reduced to a minimum.

There was a discussion on the possibilities of condensing the communiqués and Mr. Moloney pointed out that they were in fact already very condensed. Mr. Hodson was opposed to attempts at summarising them but suggested a wordage limitation of, say, 400 a day, which would prevent the ratio with other Globereuter news from being altered in favour of the enemy claims on days when they were more than usually voluminous.

So far as the Empire was concerned, Mr. Hodson was opposed to the exclusion of the communiqués from Globereuter, since the places which wanted them (e.g. South Africa) would only turn to other agencies or, more probably, the German wireless if Reuters did not carry them, while the places which did not want them (e.g. possibly the Straits Settlements, although he suspected that there had been a change of attitude here) could always exercise their powers of censorship on material picked up in a wireless news service.

Further discussion ensued on the treatment which should be given to the communiqués if they continued to be included. Mr. Moloney was of the opinion that Reuters should at all costs avoid “interpreting” them, since this would inevitably give them a value they might not otherwise have, and returned to the possibility of adding the various “tail-pieces” advocating “reserve” and caution which had been worked out with Mr. Stevens Counter-Propaganda Department. Mr. Ridsdale thought these would be ineffective.

Mr. Ridsdale then agreed that what he was objecting to was not the publication of the communiqués in the foreign press, over which Reuters had no control, but the fact that this press was able to obtain them from Reuters in the same way as from any neutral or enemy agency. Mr. Moloney said that if Reuters stopped carrying them the position in South Africa, for example, would become worse from Mr. Ridsdale's point of view, since the South African Press Association would stop taking Reuter, or stop taking it exclusively, and begin to look to another agency over which the Government had no control. Sir John Pratt said that the vernacular papers in the Far East would drop Reuters in favour of American agencies if the service ceased to wear the appearance of completeness which the inclusion of Enemy communiqués gave it.

In response to the Chairman's question whether it could be agreed that there should be “no conspicuous gaps in the Reuter service” Mr. Ridsdale said that so long as it was not possible to issue authoritative rebuttals at the same time as the communiqués he was totally opposed to their inclusion. Mr. Stevens thought that on occasions it was desirable to give an enemy communiqué a very good showing in a British news service, as in the case of certain recent Italian communiqués, but 296 3.that always the communiqué should be covered in some form, even a paraphrase.

Mr. Ridsdale again expressed himself against inclusion, as did Mr. Leigh Ashton , Mr. Hodson and Sir John Pratt were in favour of inclusion. Mr. Moloney mentioned that another region in which the communiqués were essential was Latin America.

Mr. Stevens advocated paraphrasing. Both Mr. Ridsdale and Mr. Moloney were opposed to this.

Mr. Waddell suggested that the posts which had telegraphed on this subject previously should be asked whether they would object to the inclusion of the communiqués with brief general comment. Mr. Ridsdale and Mr. Leigh Ashton strongly opposed this suggestion, on the grounds (I) that it would take some time to collect the replies and (II) that these would in any case represent only the views of individual Press Attachés or Ministers.