A History of the Ministry of Information, 1939-46

70

SECRET
EXECUTIVE BOARD
War Diary, Ministry of Information

Draft by Parliamentary for week ending May 17th

May 10th to 16th . The landing of Rudolf Hess.

Herr Hess landed in Scotland on the evening of Saturday, May 10th. He was taken to a Glasgow hospital where he gave the name of Horn and asked to see the Duke of Hamilton, On seeing the Duke he informed him that he was really Rudolf Hess and since the Duke did not recognise him or recall having met him before he produced photographs to establish his identity.

On Sunday, May 11th. the Duke flew down to Oxfordshire where the Prime Minister was staying and on the next day he returned to Glasgow with Ivone Kirkpatrick who had known Hess well in Berlin and would be able to identify him for certain. Mr. Kirkpatrick and the Duke did not reach the hospital till after midnight on Monday, the 12th : then they had an interview with Hess lasting from 12.30 to 3 a.m. on the Tuesday, May 13th .

Meanwhile, however, at 8 p.m. on Monday the 12th, the German home stations put out a statement to the effect that Hess had left Augsburg at about 6 p.m. on May 10th leaving behind him a letter which showed traces of mental disturbance. They added that “the National Socialist Movement has unfortunately in these circumstances to assume that Party Comrade Hess has crashed or met with a similar accident.” The moment this message was intercepted it was realised that the Pilot Officer in the Glasgow Hospital was in fact Rudolf Hess and that it would be safe to put out a communiqué in that sense without waiting for identification by Kirkpatrick, A statement was therefore issued from 10, Downing Street at 11.20 p.m. on May 12th, stating that the Deputy Fuhrer had landed in Scotland, was in hospital with a broken ankle, and that a Foreign Office Official had been sent to interview him in hospital.

On Tuesday morning, May 13th, the German home stations admitted that Hess had surrendered in Scotland. Several alternative explanations were put out by the German wireless for home consumption. It was suggested that Hess was the subject of hallucinations and at the same time the hint was dropped that he might have been lured into a trap by British agents. He was at the same time referred to as an “idealist who had fallen a prey to tragic hallucinations”. Herr Hess was visited by Mr. Kirkpatrick in hospital on May 12th, 14th, 15th and on May 16th he left for another destination.

The general line of publicity followed by the Ministry was to provide the press with all factual information possible but to leave them to draw their own conclusions and to make their own speculations. This policy worked well in most respects but a statement of the hospital diet being accorded to Hess (which included chicken) aroused disproportionate irritation throughout the country. It was at first assumed that the Prime Minister would take an early opportunity of making a statement in the House and he in fact undertook to do so “when he considered it in the public interest”. As the days passed, however, it became evident that the advantage of keeping the Germans guessing and not providing them with a definite line from this outweighed any possible disadvantage of allowing speculation to run riot at 71 - 2 -home. As the week passed it became more and more evident that the Prime Minister was not anxious to make a statement and by May 17th it seemed that the Hess incident, although not forgotten, was [illegible] to be front-page news.

(DRG. passim

XB. passim

PQ. 711)

Monday 12th May.

Attention was drawn to the fact that Cardinal Hinsley's addresses were heavily censored before being published in Eire. It was decided to advertise this fact, especially in the United States and in the religious papers circulating in this country.

(DAG. 568)

May 15th Thursday.

1. In connection with the treble expansion programme of the B.B.C. (for which official sanction had now been obtained) the Minister enquired at the Policy Committee what was the present position of British Broadcasting stations in the Mediterranean. It was disclosed that no transmitter existed in Cyprus, that the small private station in Malta was not strong enough to transmit to listeners in Italy, that the additional transmitter which was sent out to Palestine had been sunk en route. The Minister asked the B.B.C. to prepare a plan as soon as possible showing in what localities transmitters were most urgently needed and how they could be supplied from resources in this country or in the United States.

(Pol.Cttee. 2)

2. The Home Planning Committee again considered the request made by the Committee of Directors of Public Relations of other Departments to the effect that propaganda drive should be considered for the purpose of encouraging greater war effort in the factories and among the people generally. The D.P.Rs. had concentrated upon the theme of the “Team Spirit”, But it was felt that in the Planning Committee some wider moral stimulus should be devised. Many memoranda on the subject had recently been prepared in the Department, notably by the Productions Division, Mr. Parker and the Parliamentary Secretary, It was decided these various papers should be co-ordinated and summarised in as clear a form as possible by Mr. Francis Williams and that general approval should be obtained from the Minister and possibly from the Cabinet regarding the main line to be followed.

The importance of this discussion from the historical point of view was (a) that it suggested a difficulty of adjusting the position of this Ministry as the central authority in Government publicity, with the more specialised interests and desires of the Public Relations Officers 72 - 3 -[illegible] to the various Ministries, (b) that it disclosed how hesitant the Ministry were owing to past experience to launch any campaign destined to of make a wide emotional appeal to the public in general, (c) the difficulty deciding that any given moment was the right moment to launch a campaign and the danger lest a campaign which was launched at a non- essential moment might ruin the prospects of a later campaign succeeding.

(HFC. 888)

Friday May 16th

1. The D.G. of the B.B.C. explained how in view of the shortage of accommodation and the danger of interruption by air attack it had been decided that Overseas staff of the B.B.C. should be dispersed throughout the suburbs. It was felt that the inconvenience involved would be counter-balanced by the degree of security provided in the interests of general efficiency.

(XB.3)

2. It was decided, after consultation with the Chief Rabbi that a small Advisory Committee should be established to assist the Ministry in preparing propaganda among Jewish Religious Organisations abroad. Such an advisory body would advise purely upon religious matters and would not in any way be identified with either the Zionists or Anti-Zionists.

(XB. 4)

3. Two important instances occurred during the week in which the Ministry had difficulty in obtaining from the other Departments concerned, the release of important information.

The first instance was the landing of German planes in Syria, the news of which was somewhat delayed pending a statement on the point by the Foreign Secretary in Parliament, It was feared that if this was withheld for any length of time from the public unnecessary anxiety and distress would be caused.

The second case was the unwillingness of the Foreign Secretary to permit the publication of a reply returned by Ibn Saud to the overtures made by him to Rashid Ali. This reply which was obviously of great value for propaganda purpose had in form been addressed to the “Iraqi people” and the Ministry claimed that this ought to enable us to publish it throughout the Arab world. The Foreign Office, however, contended that Ibn Saud was very averse from any of his statements being publicised. The matter was raised personally between the Minister and the Foreign Secretary but Mr. Eden insisted that nothing should be published without Ibn Saud's permission.

(DRG. 575,576,577.)

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