NOTES FROM U.S.

In response to your request for suggestions resulting from the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill, I am putting down some thoughts, as they occur to me.

With the Bill passed and American aid assured to an almost unlimited extent, the character of Anglo American relationship changes. The whole of North America is involved and it is only a matter of time, possibly a few months - before the United States may be obliged to relinquish her so-called neutrality and face the consequences of becoming a belligerent power. During this period, which is just as important for us as the pre-Lend lease period, what is the most desirable trend, from the British point of view, in American opinion? In general terms, the answer is that American opinion should become unified in believing first, that all-out aid is both necessary and worthwhile: secondly, that Britain is using what is sent to maximum advantage; thirdly, that Britain's aims are constructive, and dynamic, and not merely defensive: fourthly, that Britain's enemy is America's enemy, and lastly that the British Empire is itself worthy of support.

To translate these, desires into accomplished facts demands the skilfully co-ordinated use of every means of communication. The screen can only play one part, but it is a role in which the wrong attitude can easily achieve an amount of harm. The screen offers the feature film, the short film and the newsreel; the feature film is not usually valuable for expressing urgent or short-term policy; but short films and newsreels can assist materially.

There is no doubt that in the past three months newsreel coverage from British sources has improved considerably. In particular, the work of the cameramen in the Libyan and Eritrean campaigns has been at least as good as the achievements of the German cameramen in the Polish and Western Front campaigns. Nothing could be better than this material of ours in fulfilling the points mentioned above, and one hopes that cameramen have accompanied the expeditionary force to Greece, which country has hitherto suffered in newsreels from very poor coverage and (apparently) inadequate means for exporting film quickly. But outside the African campaigns and the Mediterranean the results are far from ideal so far. The comments that follow may be, admittedly, of negative value in that it is not easy to find out from here what potential newsreel material exists, capable of being photographed in dramatic form and which does not contravene the dictates of National Security. There are still too many inspections, which have no appeal except to introduce popular personages and are the least striking form of military incident - such as Churchill, de Gaulle, Sikorski; too many scenes showing hurried preparations; too much emphasis on business as usual; too much ‘irrepressible’ Cockney humour symbolised in “Thumbs Up”; the U.S. are not yet emotionally belligerents.

What can be offered as a guidance in obtaining films that still contribute towards such a trend as is outlined above, and which at the same time, will be acceptable to audiences? First, every chance of photographing aggressive preparations and action should be seized upon. Cameramen should accompany 77 - 2 -raids on continental territory (as they did on the Lofoten Island raid), and even if the quality is poor, the results should be released. The story (released March 14 by Associated Press) about the equipment of invasion troops and their training should have been filmed without question. Secondly, we should photograph all extra-ordinary weapons - huge guns, extra-large bombers, tanks capable of crossing rivers, fast motor torpedo boats, long distance submarines and so on. Such items have news value (see the pictures of an ‘invasion barge’ in the American press - March 14 and 15) and they establish an aggressive attitude towards the enemy. Thirdly, it is time to illustrate more clearly the need for more merchant shipping, and the reason why. This is not an easy topic for newsreel and the reason why. This is not an easy topic for newsreel coverage, unless actuality pictures of ships sinking and men rescued are thought desirable to illustrate the urgency of the need for tonnage. (It should not be difficult to make up a scene showing officials at the Admiralty studying a huge chart of the Atlantic and moving small model ships over the surface, in convoy groups). Fourthly, little or nothing has been done to illustrate that what is being sent is being used to maximum advantage. Without giving away information to the enemy it should be possible to show in dramatic form every stage from manufacture in the United States, packing, shipment, transportation across the Atlantic, unloading, assembly, trials and delivery. Already there has been excellent coverage of manufacture and packing in the United States factories, But after that there is nothing to show. There is also an excellent story to be obtained in the flying of bombers from Bermuda to Britain - hitherto a taboo subject, but now more than ever desirable for release.

One regrets to say that the German system of placing cameramen (and killing them off) in the front line of every advance, on land, sea and air has produced results out of all proportion superior in dramatic quality and propaganda value to anything achieved by British cameramen. The German newsreels concentrate solely on two things - first, the overwhelming superiority of German armament and weapons of war, and secondly, by way of contrast, on the future of their people - healthier children, and the beautiful land they are to inherit, British newsreels emphasise the reverse that our children will inherit a land of blasted ruins, with children separated from their parents and social life disrupted, without pleading for American compassion. Hence their result is at best neutral.

The problem of deciding how far the newsreels shall report what is actually happening (and therefore emphasise tragedy by excluding normalcy) and how far they shall submit to the dictates of a rigid policy imposed upon them through Home Security, is not easy to solve, unless they are provided with an increasing amount of opportunities to photograph items that can only be interpreted as constructive, aggressive and objective.

Turning to short films, it is worth recapitulating that only London Can Take It has achieved real success, Christmas Under Fire was accepted only on the reputation of its predecessor. In March, This is England will be released; no definite arrangements have been announced for Young Veterans or Fighter Pilot at the time of writing. One purpose of this 78 - 3 -memorandum is to suggest that the time has passed for the London Can Take It , attitude (it was a magnificent film all the same) nor does This is England express any more constructive attitude; in fact with its almost classical views of ruins and its decidedly classical interest in music - making, the film suggests that Britain is settling down to its new way of life, imposed from above and therefore philosophically accepted. This may be the case, but it is altogether too passive in its effect to suit a policy of making every American believe the necessity for more material assistance for immediate constructive use. (The attitude of the various British Relief organisations is not helpful in this respect, in that they tend to emphasise suffering and privation in order to achieve maximum appeal for American sympathy.) On the other hand, the last ten minutes of Young Veterans with its panorama of armaments moving, as if unconquerable, towards the invisible enemy, inspires a feeling of constructive achievement and future victory that is completely lacking in most British wartime shorts seen so far. (Press reports of Home Guard suggest that it deals satisfactorily with the war aims in terms of the average man.) One might also mention J.B. Priestley's commentary to Britain on Guard as achieving a constructive attitude and explaining not only what we are fighting against , but what we are fighting for.

It is not sufficient for a short film about Britain in wartime simply to illustrate a phase of British life: if it does so, there must be a particular reason for wanting the American public to see that particular phase. If it has no particular reasons, the effect of the film is passive and it does not contribute towards either a current or a long run policy. A film commentated by one clear voice - the voices of American journalists in London are probably the best for the purpose - is better than a film interrupted by recorded speech varying in dialect or intonations. Let the pictures tell the story; let the commentator provide continuity and explanations where needed. From the American point of view, Dover Front Line was spoiled by requiring that the audience adjust itself to hear about five different voices in five minutes; similarly the actual voices in This is England are a hindrance rather than a help. But this opinion we have expressed it very often does not apply to actual sound recording. The sound in London Can Take It was very valuable: and so is the sound (sirens and gunfire) in War and Order , for instance. This kind of sound does not demand the same effort of adjustment as a Cockney or Yorkshire voice. The American ear should be known to producers just as if the language was a foreign one.

A further general principle can be suggested: with Americans realising their part in the war more clearly every day, their attitude towards films becomes increasingly objective. “Show us the facts, and let us form our own judgment when we have seen and heard them.” This bears out the policy embodied in the British Library of Information in regard to the written word. It places a much greater responsibility on the producers of short films for American distribution. These must show that Britain's attitude towards Hitler's Germany is fundamentally the same as the American attitude; that the two countries’ co-operation is based on common interests - the 79 - 4 -preservation of liberty, of the democratic way of life, and a constructive desire to improve standards of living and reduce social inequalities

Such ideals as these are not easily incorporated in British wartime short films, because the U.S. audience only wants to see dramatic, factual and up-to-date reporting on the screen. But they can and must be present in the films if they are to achieve full success. At the same time, our short films can avoid the stigma of insularity by stressing in every possible way the contribution of the Empire countries not as being bound by ties to Britain and therefore obliged to assist, but as free peoples who of their free will and by common consent decided to put all their might into protecting and preserving the democratic way of government and life.

Specific suggestions for short films suitable for American theatrical distribution can only be made on the assumption first that the films will be presented in a form acceptable to American audiences, and secondly that they will establish not only the right attitude towards its subject, but also will provide enough drama to merit the term ‘theatrical’. The Army, the Navy, and the R.A.F. all obviously offer drama and the constructive and objective approach. They can illustrate how American aid is being used; they can show the need for merchant tonnage and for better convoy protection; they can provide incidents of personal heroism; they offer the only way of saying that Britain is fighting an offensive war. The time has passed for mourning and horrifics; ruins, corpses, evacuation, and all the details of civilian life should be forgotten so far as the British Empire on the screen is concerned. Their effect is static and passive, and it detracts from the main end in view which is now to galvanise into activity the combined forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Dominions fighting and winning battles on land, sea and air, with the single aim of defeating Germany and conquering Hitlerism.