313 314 2. 315 3. 316 4.

MR
Copy on EP/108.
MEMORANDUM ON PUBLICITY IN IRELAND

1. Objective.

In the absence of specific guidance from higher authority, we have had to formulate the objective of our publicity in and for Eire by the light of common sense and our knowledge of circumstances there. The first commonsense rule to be applied is that we should aim only at what it is practicable to achieve; for by attempting the unattainable we might fail to perform the possible. Consequently our propaganda is not directed, for example, to the immediate objective of drawing Eire into the war, since the vast majority of the population of that country support the present policy of neutrality. Nor, indeed, is it certain that our ultimate advantage would be served if Eire did join in the war. As a corollary of this, our objective is not to persuade the Irish to agree to actions, such as handing over the ports to us, which they believe would instantly bring them into the war. Unless and until we are instructed that we must try to bring Irish public opinion to support some particular policy (such as providing us with extra supplies of food, or releasing interned British airmen) our objective must be the general one of causing Irish public opinion to be as favourable towards us and as unfavourable towards our enemies as possible, in order that it may decide in our favour when any new contingency arises. The contingency might be, for instance, an American approach in relation to the ports, a German invasion of Eire, or half-a-dozen other things. Included in this broad objective is, of course, that of countering enemy propaganda. The objective helps to define the method we must continually persuade and tempt Irish opinion, rather than brow-beat or threaten it; for the latter method may be appropriate to secure immediate results, but is obviously useless if the aim is to keep opinion continually and increasingly “sweet”.

2. Official Relations .

All our publicity in and for Eire must be conducted in close consultation with the Dominions Office. We also have a constant interchange of information and ideas with the M.O.8. and M.I.5 branches of the War Office. On points affecting Northern Ireland, we keep in touch with the representative of the Northern Ireland Government in London. The newly appointed Press Attaché in Dublin as on the staff of the United Kingdom representative (Sir John Maffey) and is responsible through him to the Dominions Office, not to the Ministry of Information. Since, however, the post was created at our insistence, and Mr. Betjeman was nominated by us and transferred from his post elsewhere in the Ministry, there is no reason to anticipate any trouble from the lack of direct formal control over him.

3. Peculiarities of the Problem .

(a) The Irish censorship makes the problem of publicity in Eire much more like that of an extremely suspicious foreign country than that of any other part of the British Commonwealth or a friendly foreign country like the United States. It is impossible to conduct propaganda by means of leaflets, posters, exhibitions, newsreels or any such material; for they would be instantly suppressed if they were contentious. On the only occasion on which, by a clerical error, two small parcels of propaganda material intended for home consumption were sent to branches of a commercial firm in Eire, they were intercepted by the Irish censor and a protest made through the High Commissioner. Printed material - even press cuttings - is removed from private correspondence. There are almost as great difficulties in the way of getting favourable material in the Irish newspapers, whether pictures or reading matter, though it is hoped that the appointment of a Press Attaché will at least put us on an equal footing with the enemy in this field.

(b) On the other hand, there is virtually an open frontier between Eire and part of the United Kingdom. There are limits, nevertheless, to the volume of personal or paper propaganda which can flow over this border. The existence of the border is, of course, an outstanding grievance in the eyes of the Eire Government and the majority of the Eire people, and a constant effort is needed to dissociate our war propaganda from the political issue of partition.

(c) There are many peculiarities in the problem arising from the close geographical and social relations between Eire and the United Kingdom. Channels of trade and personal correspondence and travel are continually open, and Home organs of publicity are available to the Irish people.

4. Direct Means of Propaganda

(a) The Press (including topical pictures).

i. The London offices of the principal Eire newspapers are almost useless as a means of introducing propaganda material or special items of news or pictures. They exercise scarcely any news-gathering or editorial functions, and are mainly business offices. The principal source of British and world news for the Irish newspapers is the P.A. tape. The Press Association also offer special items of Irish interest to the Irish newspapers, for a price, but this is not a good means of introducing favourable items, as there is a strong sales resistance to these P.A. “specials”, for which extra fees have to be paid. We have occasionally made effective use, on a small scale, of a private news agency serving the Irish daily and periodical press which is run by a Mr. James A. Whelan. Mr. Whelan is favourable to our cause, and has shown himself helpful particularly in relation to news of Catholic interest. Mr. Betjeman is investigating the possibility of making extra use of this agency.

ii. It is hoped that personal contact by the Press Attaché, and the continuous supply of material which sails as close as possible to the censorship wind, will enable us to do much more through the Irish newspapers at the other end.

(b) Radio .

i. It is not considered that direct propaganda addressed to people in Eire by the B.B.C., whether in English or in Erse, would at present achieve a useful purpose. The Irish are apt to resent exhortation and to be suspicious of what would manifestly be war propaganda.

ii. A very useful channel of connection with Eireann broadcasting authorities has been established by the Joint Broadcasting Committee. After the former had been tempted by means of certain musical and literary material - some of it with a slight propaganda twist - they asked for a complete catalogue of J.B.C. productions and have ordered a wide selection, Mr. Betjeman has been asked to look out for more possibilities in this field.

(c) Films.

There is no apparent possibility of securing a market for war propaganda films, whether British or foreign, or for newsreels relating to the war. There may be a chance of getting a few non-political documentaries shown, but the general outlook in this field is poor.

(d) Literature . No large scale distribution of literature is possible, but there may be opportunities for extending the sale of particular books, especially those which appeal to Catholics. Not many people in Eire read Northern Ireland newspapers, though along the frontier there is a certain sale of Ulster papers on Sundays when no papers appear in Eire. A good many people in Eire read English newspapers, particularly those with Northern editions. It is not feasible to attempt to expand the sale of these newspapers by dumping large quantities for display in Eire, on sale-or-return or any other terms; for there is a tax of a penny per copy on all newspapers entering the country and this has to be paid in advance. We ought to encourage the canvassing of people in Eire to become regular subscribers to British newspapers. Another fruitful line may be the introduction and circulation of copies of American periodicals like “Life” or “Time”, which are “neutral” and include matter critical of Britain or favourable to the enemy but which are on the whole pro-British.

(e) Commercial Contacts. It has not yet been possible to, organise any system of propaganda through commercial channels. The distribution of leaflets or similar matter is barred, and therefore everything depends on our being able to find and coach sound and reliable British business men personally visiting Ireland.

(f) Personal Visits.

i. A number of people who, it was thought, would be specially useful in making contacts and telling the right story in special quarters have been assisted to go to Eire, The idea has been mooted that use should be made of the scheme for evacuating mothers and children to Eire by appointing welfare officers who would be chosen for their ability to tell the story that we would want told. This idea is being investigated, but does not sound very hopeful.

ii. A number of other people visiting Eire for private reasons have come to us for advice, which has been gladly given. We have inclined to favour, rather than not, the grant of exit permits to private individuals, in order to promote intercourse between the two peoples and the spread of mutual understanding. A suggestion is at present being investigated for entering into correspondence with all those who apply for exit permits, but this would have to be done under private and unofficial auspices, and there are a number of difficulties which have not yet been overcome.

iii. Special value attaches to the visits of the representatives of Allied countries, particularly Poles and Catholic Dutchmen. One of the most successful of the officially assisted visits was that of a leading Pole and it is to be repeated. The War Office have been asked for their advice on the proposal that Polish and other Allied officers should be encouraged to spend their leave in Eire, and enquiry is also being made into the possibility of getting trade union leaders from Allied countries (or refugees from enemy countries) to go over and talk with Irish trade unionists.

(g) Private Correspondence . One of the best ways of conducting propaganda in Eire would undoubtedly be to encourage British people with friends or relatives in Eire to write to them frequently, telling them about our attitude towards the war and our confidence in victory. The organising of this has been beyond the means available to us hitherto.

(h) The Church . The Catholic Church is obviously of very great importance in affecting opinion in Eire. Unfortunately, there is a tendency in Irish Catholic circles to discount the opinion of English Catholics. Nor does such opinion escape the excisions of the Irish censor. There is probably room for further effort, however, to secure the dissemination in Eire of utterances by leading Catholics both British and foreign.

(i) Foreign Diplomatic Posts. The influence of the American and French Legations and of the representatives of other Allied countries and of Canada may be very great. Mr. Betjeman will report on this. Mr. Gray, the United States Minister, has been particularly helpful, and the majority of the staff of the French-Legation also are reported to be pro-British.

5. Indirect Means of Propaganda

(a) The Home Press . Apart from the relatively small number of copies of British newspapers read in Eire, the Irish newspapers may be counted on to reproduce and criticise what is said about Eire in the British press. It is, therefore, important that we should do our best to ensure that the press here conforms with our general propaganda line: that is to say, it ought to be discouraged from abusing the Irish and encouraged to take a sympathetic and understanding, however critical, attitude towards them. Cartoons deriding Eire, or Mr. de Valera personally, are particularly offensive.

(b) The British Radio. By far the most potent means of influencing Irish opinion, in so far as it can he used, is the ordinary Home programme of the B.B.C. Unfortunately, security considerations have greatly reduced the strength of the B.B.C. signal to large parts of Eire, and listening may be difficult there. Despite this handicap, it is highly desirable to render the B.B.C. programmes as tempting as possible to Irish listeners. A weekly programme of special Irish interest has been proposed, and the B.B.C. are considering this. There is every excuse for it in the large numbers of Irishmen within the ordinary jurisdiction of the B.B.C., without having to address them in Eire itself. The B.B.C. should be pressed on this point.

(c) Irishmen Overseas. Special attention should be paid to Irish communities in the Dominions and the United States in our own or local propaganda in these countries.

(d) Irish Communities in Great Britain. Regional Information Officers should likewise be encouraged to pay special attention to Irish colonies, since the correspondence of these people with their relations in Eire may, be a fruitful source of helpful or adverse propaganda.

(e) Special Occasions. Opportunity should be taken of any special occasions of Irish interest to emphasise the community of interest between Great Britain and Ireland and the great part being played by Irishmen in the war. St. Patrick's Day for example, should be made an occasion of special B.B.C. programmes etc., and a plan has already been put up for next March 17. Among other things, the military authorities in Northern Ireland have been asked to encourage friendly football matches or dances in Border camps on that day, and it is hoped that some of these will be reported over here, as well as in Eire itself.

6. Themes of Propaganda

The first defect of Irish public opinion from our point of view is ignorance on war issues, the result of the severe Irish censorship. The first objective of our propaganda must therefore be to convey the facts about the war - the issues at stake and the manner in which it is being fought. The second defect of Irish opinion is a tendency towards defeatism , as we see it, We must therefore use every opportunity of telling of our strength and will to win. It is particularly important to offset the exaggerated reports of the effects of air raids which have reached Ireland in gossip, through private correspondence, and from the mouths of those who have taken refuge in that country. The third defect is an excessive self-importance , which makes the Irish feel that they can take a high line with all the world. It is desirable to persuade them of their own isolation - particularly of the growing hostility of American and Dominion public opinion, even in émigré Irish circles - and of their danger in a world dominated by aggression and violence. The fourth, and closely associated, defect is that of insularity . To combat this, it is necessary to play upon the Roman Catholic connections of the Irish, reminding them constantly of the cruelty and oppression suffered by their fellow Catholics at German hands; and upon their sense of being a part of European civilisation, which is threatened by Nazi barbarism. The fifth defect is suspicion towards Great Britain. Our efforts must be directed, therefore, to emphasising the British honesty of purpose, the reality of freedom for small nations within the British Commonwealth or under its shelter, and British understanding of Eire's outlook and problems.