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APPENDIX 2
SECRET
CLYDEBANK RAID - PUBLIC BEHAVIOUR .
INTELLIGENCE .

1. General .

It is agreed by all observers that the bearing of the people in Clydebank was beyond praise. They are of a high moral and intellectual calibre. A large proportion are skilled workers. On neither day was there any sign of panic or of a blind rush away from the devastated area in spite of the great intensity and long duration of the attacks. There was, of course, a considerable private evacuation, but the people moving out knew what they were doing. On the Saturday morning in the Parkhall area men were active in and about their ruined houses. Women and children were cheerful. There were one or two faint grumbles about local government leaders, but in the main the people concerned themselves most about the whereabouts of relatives and friends. Little or no mention was made to outsiders of family losses. For example, two well-dressed men asked us quietly about arrangements for private burial, but gave no details; and there were many expressions of relief at having escaped death or injury.

The remarkable immunity of Anderson and surface shelters, both of which types survived very near hits by heavy bombs and mines, was talked about with great surprise and relief. The advocates of “deep shelters”, by concentrating on the aspect of protection and safety (as against that of quiet) had persuaded many that the existing shelters were comparatively unsafe. The effectiveness of the shelters, and of the strutted closes, was an important influence in restoring and maintaining confidence.

On Friday and on Saturday morning there was much expressed anxiety about furniture but this gave place later on the Saturday, after the people had moved about and mixed with others, to a disregard for material possessions. “I thought I was badly off” women would say “until I saw what had happened to poor Mrs. So-and-so”. But they were still naturally preoccupied with the practical problem of the safe-keeping or removal of furniture. Later, in the centre of the town, the same cheerfulness and patience was even more in evidence. People standing in the queues showed an amazing desire not to give trouble to helpers coming in from outside. By this time it seemed to be taken for granted that the officials were facing many great difficulties and were doing their best. There was no sign of recriminations for alleged deficiences in the past; the faint grumbles mentioned above were not typical. The people were naturally reluctant to ask for relief. “I've come to report war damage” was a phrase often heard.

There was a striking absence of references to the “capitalist bosses” who had been formerly charged as responsible for the war by the articulate and political-minded Clydebank workers. Only two drunk men could be found who were repeating the once familiar ritual.

Many visitors from the south, including some skilled observers of public behaviour and opinion, were most apprehensive of the possible effects of heavy raids on the Clyde. The people, they said, were mainly unprepared for bombing; many were indifferent to the war; many were taken up with disputes and hostilities to employers, to local or national government. All this was to a certain extent true and it therefore renders all the more striking the actual behaviour and demeanour of the Clydebank people in the most intensive and damaging raid on any single town in the course of the war. Mr. W.A. Sinclair who spent the first days of the London raids in East End shelters, writes of the Saturday

“Morale appeared to me to be very high indeed, and distinguishably higher than in the East End of London under comparable conditions last September. This is of course a dubious comparison, as the Cockney's active cheerfulness and the Clydesider's quiet composure are not readily commensurable, but in so far as the comparison can be made, the Clydebank morale did appear to me to be higher. This may indicate a quality of character, or it may merely indicate that my estimate of the psychological unpreparedness had been grossly exaggerated. I have as yet no opinion on this”.

2. Fire-fighting unpreparedness .

A considerable part of the devastation caused by fire in Radnor Park and Parkhall might have been prevented had the people adequately equipped and prepared themselves. The man who said (Before the raid) “The workers have nothing at stake in this war: they should have nothing to do with it”, was providing some sort of justification for an apathy shown by many beside himself. Another incident reveals this exceptional unpreparedness. An inquiry conducted by us into the public response to the pictorial advertisements on fire-bomb fighting (in the Sunday paper of March 2) shows that roughly 60% to 70% of the Scottish public saw and paid attention to this advertisement. But in Clydebank (where very few do not read Sunday papers) it was hardly ever mentioned. At a War Commentary meeting in Clydebank on March 9, (a week after, to be true) out of a group of over 300 only 12 could remember seeing this advertisement.

It is true that the fault was not entirely on the side of the private individual. Some people who had ordered stirrup-pumps had difficulty in getting them. The two bags of sand to a house or tenement landing were insufficient to cope with the recurring showers of fire-bombs. There were no ladders from the top tenement landings to the high ceilings of Radnor Park tenements. The breakdown of water supply compelled the Fire Brigade and the Auxiliary Fire Service (as other reports show) to confine their attention to the lower parts of the town. But with all this it remains the fact that the people themselves by taking adequate preparations could have saved a half or more of destroyed Clydebank. This is now almost universally admitted by the victims themselves. The lesson will be driven home in Ministry of Information meetings and by other means.

This evidence of mental unpreparedness for bombing would seem to show that Clydebank morale is rooted, in Mr. Sinclair's words quoted above, in a ‘quality of character’, the quality of courage.

3. Reception Areas .

There are reports of some bitterness in isolated cases where private householders have refused admission to raid victims. On Wednesday for example, Glasgow postal censorship reports a demand that “all Churches and halls should be opened to refugees who have been badly received in Alyth, Perthshire”. But these reports are exceptional and the behaviour of the bombed out people in the Vale of Leven and elsewhere in the face of very trying circumstances has again been marked by quiet patience. “Local and National Government officials”, says an observer who has travelled in all the blitzed areas, “have a great deal to live up to to be worthy of these people”.

From Milngavie comes the report that half of the bombed out people “instead of coming to be washed went to listen to the band in the public park - this sounded to me an excellent sign”. Agreed.

4. Reprisals .

There was little evidence of a strong demand for reprisals at first among the mass of the raid victims. Little enmity was expressed towards Germans, though Hitler (‘that man’) was frequently mentioned in tones of loathing. But the quiet thinking type of folk who had hitherto been against the bombing of the German people had changed their minds. “It's not a nice thing to bomb civilians”, they said, “ but we've got to. The Germans are laughing at us”. “It's obvious he's out to destroy our morale by destroying our houses. It's high time we set out to break their morale”. This opinion is growing stronger every day. It is helped by the universal conviction in Clydebank that the attack on the houses of Parkhall and Radnor Park, carried out in brilliant moonlight, was quite deliberate. [In this connection a German “Broadcast from the Front” on Monday by a Clyde raider is significant - “The multitude of ships in the river” he said “was tempting. But our orders were different”].

5. The Return to Work .

The most vital sign of the underlying toughness and determination of Clydebank has been shown by the return of the workers. On Monday of this week the Apprentices' Committee decided to recommend the striking apprentices to get back to work, but the bombed out apprentices had already made up their minds. They had been to the gates of Yarrow's that morning trying to get in. The great bulk of the workers had made their way back to Clydebank from wherever they were, anxious to start. We made some enquiries as to where the workers normally resident in Clydebank intended to spend the night. Those who were preparing to stay in Clydebank had no anxieties as to where they would go. They were going up to such and such a shelter; they were sleeping in the works shelter. No, they weren't worrying about special billets in Clydebank. All they wanted was their grub, and when was the Town Hall going to open for tea? At this point the Town Hall opened and the men swarmed in to enjoy a remarkably large and appetising meal.

6. Factors affecting morale .

The main topics of conversation among the bombed-out people just now, indicate the factors most likely to maintain or weaken the splendid spirit and toughness of the workers. Chief of these without a doubt is that of compensation for war damage. If the workers and their families feel that they are being treated fairly by the Government in this respect, they will overlook other and relatively minor inconveniences. Workers given generous immediate relief “come out and along the road as though they had pulled off a double”. A recurrent question is “When will we be paid for war damage? Soon or after the war?” They are keen to get back to as near normal as possible: this means for them a new outfit of clothes, a new house or comfortable quarters or the guarantee of such in the not too remote future; in short, the chance of a new start. As one worker put it “If the Government does fairly by us it'll be a terrific spoke in the wheel of the Communist Party. The Communist Party say the State is the organ of suppression of the workers but if we are treated fairly it will take all the sting out of that kind of criticism”.

A present sore spot is that some people who removed and stored their furniture, assuming that they would be compensated, are now becoming aware that so far they are unlikely to be refunded their expenses of removal and storage (the latter may be considerable - some are paying 10/- a week for storage). They have misunderstood the instruction (often heard at second or third hand) that the Government would remove and store furniture. This instruction applies, we understand, to furniture left for official removal and storage - furniture left in the street has been removed and the category now being removed is that of furniture in houses scheduled for demolition. The people who removed their own furniture thought that they were acting in the spirit of the Government's intention.

A related problem, little mentioned just now, is “Will we be expected to pay rent for our uninhabitable Clydebank house?

An exceptionally important point (in that it will still influence morale tremendously the more workers are convinced that on the big question of war damage they are getting a fair deal) is that raised in our previous report on “Workers and Managements”.

The anger and determination of the men to get even with Hitler for what he has done to Clydebank and may do to other places, should without doubt make them even more keenly critical of any apparent delays on the management side. Their previous reaction to any such appearance of slackness tended to be a cynical one and as such was exploited by the “revolutionary defeatists”. We are watching to see how the Communists will attempt to meet the new mood of the workers. Meanwhile it is all the more important that the management should take the leading shop stewards into their confidence in the case of any hold-up which can not be explained in terms of the difficulties caused by the bombing.

Other secondary factors are the comfort and safety of families in reception areas, the adequacy or otherwise of transport to the yards and workshops (for those removed from Clydebank) the provision of temporary sleeping accommodation (for workers remaining in Clydebank) - the dry weather in the last few days has eased many problems here - and the provision of adequate meals in Clydebank. This last service is being carried out very well indeed. The others are less advanced.

With regard to housing and sleeping accommodation for the workers, is consideration being given to the building for the workers of a hut town on the moors? Clydebank with its shipyards, is a tempting target which the Luftwaffe is likely to visit again. If this is the official view it would seen unwise to do much more in the town than first-aid repairs to houses, and to provide near the town war-time huts on the Army model for the men now without a doubt in the front-line.

7. Presentation of News .

There is considerable irritation in Clydebank at the treatment of the raids in the official communiqués before Tuesday 18th inst. The announcement on Wednesday morning, 19th inst. of the casualties over the whole area as being 500 dead and 800 injured is regarded with some scepticism. There are however few wild rumours in Clydebank itself.

Public Relations Branch,

St. Andrew's House,

Edinburgh, 1.

20th March, 1941.