A History of the Ministry of Information, 1939-46

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APPENDIX .
PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE U.S.A.
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This week special reports on the above subject have been asked for and received from all regions. The following is a summary of the main points made.

I. Attitude to the U.S.A. before the Japanese attack.

Over the past 6 months there has been a steady growth in admiration for President Roosevelt, a firm conviction that he was “all out” to help us, and an increasing realisation of the gap between him and his administration, and American public opinion as a whole. The strength of isolationist feeling was brought home particularly by:-

1. The news of strikes and industrial unrest.

2. The narrowness of the margin by which the Neutrality Act was repealed.

While American help both in supplies and in the Battle of the Atlantic was increasingly appreciated, criticism was frequently made of:-

1. The volume of talk which was thought to be a characteristic feature of American politics.

2. The use of “high-falutin'” phrases describing America's part in the war and in the defence of democracy, when we and the Russians were doing the actual fighting and bearing the blows. There was, and still is, a certain “hang-over” from the supposedly excessive claims of the Americans after the last war.

It is pointed out that the frankness with which British people treat America is very similar to their attitude towards the Dominions, and even to the attitude adopted by England to Scotland, Wales and Ireland (and vice versa). The “malicious glee” reported after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour is not dissimilar to the “satisfaction” with which certain English blitzed towns received the news of heavy raids on other cities, (there was, of course, also a very large volume of human sympathy for the blitzed populations, particularly in the smaller cities attacked). It appears that America is not really regarded as a foreign country, to be wooed with praise, but as a close relative to be chided freely for her shortcomings.

II. Attitude immediately following the outbreak of hostilities.

Public feeling during the first few days of hostilities was along the following lines:-

1. Great satisfaction that America was “at last in with us”.

2. The immediate American disasters produced:-

a. Dismay at the evidence of unpreparedness. This was added to by our offer of Canadian shells.

b. A widespread but apparently superficial “malicious glee” that she was “caught napping even worse than us”.

c. A fear that lease-lend supplies - particularly of armaments to Russia and food to us - would “dry up”.

3. It was felt that “at last America would really get down to industrial production.”

4. It was hoped that the initial set-backs would prevent the U.S.A. suffering from an initial period of complacency such as we experienced.

5. It was believed that the whole of America would at last be united behind the President, and that he would no longer have to “nurse” public opinion.

6. It was regretted that America had had to be forced into the war by the Japanese attack, and the declarations of Germany and Italy, and that she had not taken the initiative against the Axis.

7. There was much jocular comment on American morale, and a widespread belief, and even hope, that her citizens would stand up to air-raids less satisfactorily than ours. Mayor La Guardia's advice to New Yorkers not to scream was particularly appreciated.

8. The absence of aerial attack on Japanese cities was unfavourably commented on, and there appeared to be little appreciation of the size of the Pacific theatre of war.

9. It was, and is, generally thought that, while American Navy and Air Force can be relied on, the American Army is most inefficient. This belief is attributed to publicity given to “unwilling conscripts” and to efforts to “contract out of the Army”. The ubiquity of girls in films of American Army life is also commented on.

10. It was feared that extreme Isolationists of the Lindberg class constituted a potentially dangerous Fifth Column.

11. Those who had not sent their children to America “patted themselves on the back”.

III. Subsequent reactions.

There is evidence of a steady improvement in feeling towards America, and of an increasing readiness to “work in harness with the U.S.A. in spite of minor irritations”. The following points in particular are noted:-

1. While it was not for a moment doubted that we should win the war, there had for some time been speculation as to “how this could be done on land”. (Such speculation had, however, vanished following the Russian victories). It is now felt that American man and machine power supplies the “necessary means to certain victory”. The news that the American Army will serve overseas if necessary caused great satisfaction.

2. The sinking of the British battleships, and the vigorous Japanese attacks on Hong Kong and Malaya convinced the public that the Japanese were “our business as well as the Americans'”, and that we were “really on the job together”.

3. The President's prompt sacking of the American army chiefs at Hawaii was favourably contrasted with our failure to sack anyone at Singapore.

4. It was hoped that, at the earliest possible moment, a joint strategy would be worked out by a council including Britain, U.S.A., the Dominions and Russia (this was before the news of Mr. Churchill's trans-Atlantic visit).

5. The news that Lease-Lend commitments would be fulfilled was greatly welcomed.

6. The sight of so much American tinned food in the shops was hailed, particularly by women, as evidence that American supplies were still arriving. Spam and Mor were described as “America's best ambassadors”.

7. That America and Britain are at last full partners is thought to increase the chances of a stable and peaceful world after the war.

IV. Some general points.

1. While the public are prepared to make any sacrifices necessary to help Russia, it is pointed out that they have no such disposition towards America. There appears to be a widespread feeling that America is “too damned wealthy”, that Americans are too mercenary-minded, and that the hardship and suffering of war will “do them a lot of good”, Thus, the offer of Canadian shells, in addition to causing comments about unpreparedness, also provoked a temporary wave of bad feeling that we should have to give help to America.

2. It appears that the main picture of America which British people have is that which she has painted of herself in her commercial films - a land of material plenty - with little or nothing of the home and family life as British people understand it.

3. Apart from President Roosevelt, no American public figures have “caught on” permanently, and there is little interest in their doings or sayings.

4. Very little is known about the traditions, uniforms, and so on, of the American forces.

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December 24, 1941.

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