A History of the Ministry of Information, 1939-46

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Effects of Enemy Air Raid Action upon Hull, on the nights of Thursday 13th March, Friday 14th March, and Tuesday 18th March, 1941
SECRET

Report by Hull and East Riding Information Committee (No. 2.)

Sub-committee: Rev. Canon A. Berry

Councillor Mrs. Hangar and Mr. James M. Peddie

The immediate post-raid effects of each of these raids, are dealt with separately, but value has been derived from our ability to take a retrospective view of the reaction, resulting from these raids and to make estimates of the cumulative psychological effects.

The Raid of Thursday, 13th March .

On the night of Thursday the 13th March, Hull suffered a severe raid. There were over a 150 incidents in various parts of the city. 26 Reception Centres were thrown open, and a total of 1,773 admissions were made to such Reception Centres. At the District Offices up to the evening of the 16th March, a total of 3,294 persons were dealt with and of these 2,216 reported for billeting. These figures give some indication of the extent of the social dislocation created by the raid. It was a heavy raid but not a “blitz”.

A general evacuation took place in one working class area, due to unexploded bombs.

In the course of our investigations we visited the St. Paul's area, Bean Street, Fountain Road Centres and the North Hull Estate, as well as making investigations in numerous other districts where bomb damage was experienced. In all of these districts we had the opportunity of having conversations with people both immediately following the raid and some days later. This to our minds adds to the value of the report, as it gave us the opportunity of forming an estimate of the cumulative psychological effects.

THE ST. PAUL'S AREA

In the St. Paul's Area, the effect of the raid upon public morale was serious. We arrived at the considered opinion, that this area did not stand up to the raid shock as well as did other districts. The morale of the people was lower than that observed elsewhere. This in our opinion has a physical basis.

The St. Paul's area is poverty stricken with intolerably bad housing conditions. The general social and cultural standards of the people are low and have been for years. Migration to the suburbs from this district to the more congenial Corporation Housing Estates has apparently robbed the locality of its more vigorous elements, and left a residue of population that appears to have very little energy and with their “morale strength” definitely sapped.

It is not the purpose of this report to engage upon any socialogical study, but merely to report faithfully upon the facts as we find them, yet in explanation, we must express our belief that what we saw can be considered a legacy of enervating pre-war social conditions, that prevailed in this area.

POST-RAID REACTION

The immediate post-raid reaction in the St. Paul's area, was one of complete helplessness and resignation . It was this attitude of resignation that provided the most disquieting feature. It was not a healthy willingness to accept misfortune without grumbling, but hopeless and indeed helpless incapacity, to appreciate the significance of their plight, and the reasons for the disaster.

Naturally we did observe some exceptions to this general condition, but they were in the minority, and do not effect the general impressions we formed, concerning the condition of the whole district.

In the centres dealing with these unfortunate people, we found that the officials experienced far more irksome difficulties than was the case in other parts of the city, and this can perhaps be considered due to the conditions described above.

SPECIAL TREATMENT NEEDED

We feel that the existence, of such “black spots” of morale should be recognised for surely they are not completely unique. War time social changes are perhaps having the effect of improving the relative material position of these people. Yet we believe that the Ministry of Information so far as its work in stimulating and maintaining morale is concerned, should either directly or through its local committees, deal with the particular problems that such districts demand .

There is a feeling of apathy settling upon the district which can, and should be dispelled. As pointed out, the basic cause is perhaps physical, but in our view these “black spots” present special problems which need individual attention, and specialised campaigning. The general flow of Ministry of Information material leaves these people untouched.

NORTH HULL ESTATE

By contrast the people of the district of the North Hull Estate gave a remarkable demonstration of high morale. We were able to move throughout the whole of the affected area and had many conversations. We can frankly state that in not one single case did we see any undue fear or weakening of morale. Obviously in the first post-raid hours, shock was felt, but the recovery was really remarkable.

Our further visits to this district some days after the raid demonstrated how this rapid recovery had been maintained. So far as damage to morale was concerned, we have no hesitation in saying that the bombing raid was completely valueless.

COMMENTS UPON RECEPTION CENTRE ORGANISATION

In the King's Hall Reception Centre we had the opportunity of interviewing a number of people on the evening following the night of the raid. There appeared to be several who had not been allocated to any particular billets.

We saw one young woman an expectant mother in the 20s with four children who had apparently lost contact with the authorities, and was not aware of any place to where she could be taken. The woman appeared incapable of making any effort for herself, and it appeared to us rather easy for the authorities to lose contact with such people. The woman herself was not very intelligent, and appeared to have no interest at all in her condition or surroundings. She was an unfortunate case. At the College of Commerce, they had no knowledge of this person nor of her family, and this we thought was regrettable, as she obviously needed some attention.

There was another young woman anxiously enquiring for her father. He was not in the King's Hall Centre. The person in charge said that she had left him in bed in the Methodist Chapel opposite. We went across. The Chapel was empty, and the old man had apparently gone or had been removed without the person in charge being aware of the fact. The College of Commerce were unable to give any particulars.

STRAIN UPON THE SERVICES

The strain upon the services was certainly much greater than that of previous raids. The scattered nature of the incidents and the number of centres that had to be opened meant a greatly increased burden. There did not appear in our opinion to be the ease of movement in the organisation that was apparent on the occasion of the East Hull Raid, previously reported.

This is not intended as a criticism but merely as are the incidents quoted above, given to demonstrate the considerable strength of organisation that is needed to stand up to any heavy raid, or a raid with numerous scattered incidents. It must be realised that the actual burden upon the organisation grows in increasing ratio with any increase in the range and extent of the damage .

BEAN STREET RAID. FRIDAY NIGHT 14th MARCH .

A parachute mine was dropped in the Bean Street District, West Hull, on the night of the 14th March. Considerable damage was done. In view of the damage and the resultant shock the people of this district stood up amazingly well to the disaster.

A large number of people were affected. We had the opportunity of discussing with many persons and judging the immediate effect and later observing their reaction some days later. The first reaction was one of considerable shock, but their recovery was rapid. It is to this rapidity of recovery that we can pay tribute, indicating as it does the high morale of the people.

The following incident is quoted as being typical of the spirit shown by the people of Bean Street. It is interesting to mention that Bean Street is almost as poor a district as the St. Paul's area and the actual shock effect of the raid should perhaps have been even greater in view of the damage done.

HOW THE BARBER TOOK IT :

At noon on the Saturday following the Friday night Raid, one of the signatories to this report, was in a barber's shop in the city. Conversation veered round to the Raid of the previous night, and the dropping of the parachute mine in the Bean Street Area. “I got a packet” said the barber. “The Mrs., myself and the two kids were in the cupboard under the stairs, then I popped out to put the kettle on and the lad joined me.

We were both just sat round the fire - and then we got it”. “Never heard a damn thing - it must have come down in carpet slippers. But I knew what was up when the house fell in - soot poured down upon us, if it had not have been such tough luck, I should have laughed - the kid and myself looked like a couple of nigger minstrels”.

The man's wife and family were unharmed, but it required a big heart for a man to talk like he did, when his home had been smashed only a few hours before.

COMMENTS UPON THE BARRAGE

The anti-aircraft barrage of the night of the raid, was intense. The following day, people appeared to have been impressed by the strength of our defences, and many expressed the opinion that the damage would have been much greater had it not been for the barrage. It is interesting to compare this reaction with that following the Thursday “blitz”.

PUBLICITY FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FACILITIES

In several districts following both raids, we found a number of people who had actually been affected by the raid, but were unaware of the facilities available. Some minor criticisms were expressed by one or two persons because they were not easily and quickly informed as to where they could go. We ourselves realised the tremendous difficulties involved and found that many who complained did not make the effort to find and use the facilities to a extent that was possible. It would appear however, in many cases that it is necessary for extraordinary measures to be taken in order to ensure that everyone needing help receives it .

We mention this fact largely as a suggestion that the local Information Committee itself might be able to give some assistance towards the end of securing more publicity for existing post-raid welfare facilities.

Raid of Tuesday, 18th March, 1941 .

The aerial attack on the night of Tuesday the 18th March was the heaviest that Hull has ever experienced. The period of the alarm lasted for almost seven hours, and between 9.15 p.m. and 4 a.m. there was incessant noise of aerial bombardment, gun fire and the intermittent dropping of bombs. The noise was intense, and the constant droning of the 'planes throughout the night, with hardly a moment's respite, was for many people a nerve shattering ordeal.

BARRAGE

There were many who hoped that night, judging by the extent of the gun fire, that substantial damage was being inflicted upon the enemy, and the following morning there were many expressions of disappointment at the efficiency of the barrage, when the bomb damage was seen and it was learned that no 'planes had been brought down. A large proportion of the general public appeared to be somewhat critical.

We personally feel that there is need for public education of the real purpose of a barrage. Up to now the public have been taught that noise during a raid is reassuring, because it would spring from the guns inflicting damage upon the raiders. On the morning following the “blitz” many awoke to the fact that the noise that was thought to be deadly to the enemy, was actually that of bombs destroying our own city.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTION

We had the opportunity of completing a most detailed study extending over a wide area of the city, and covering many individual investigations, so far as psychological reaction of the raid is concerned.

We are in a position now to take a retrospective view, and estimate the psychological effects in their true perspective. There is no doubt that the morale of those who were actually affected by the raid or who were in the immediate vicinity of the bombing, was low on the morning following the raid. The people were greatly shocked and affrighted, and a feeling of horror was uppermost.

When the disorder and the destruction of the “blitz” was seen at its worst in the early morning following the night of the raid, there were many expressions of “Is it worth it?”; “This simply cannot go on”. Sentiments such as these demonstrated the dominant feeling of the affected public that morning.

They were not isolated expressions. This feeling of despondency persisted throughout the whole of the day, following the raid, but the ultimate dispersal was extraordinarily visible. It is this fact that is deserving of particular mention. Spirits were low after the raid, but the recovery was phenomenal.

Towards the evening of Wednesday, the 19th March, there was a feeling that a repeat bombing might be made, but it was not. By Friday in a general sense psychological normality had been about reached.

The raid was an extremely serious one, and the scattered nature of the bombing caused almost all of the town to be affected. Shock was certainly more apparent than after any previous raid. This can of course be attributed to the fact that the raid was more serious and far longer than any experience before.

REHOUSING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT

The extent of the raid was such as to make the greatest call that has been made so far upon the services of the Post-Raid Welfare. On previous occasions we have had cause to comment upon the enthusiasm and keenness that has characterised the work of the officials of the Corporation and the voluntary workers concerned with post-raid social welfare.

As a result of our investigations following the Tuesday night's “blitz” we feel fully justified in expressing appreciation of the selflessness, good spirit and enthusiasm that the workers displayed. In the course of our investigations, we observed a few incidents some of which we will mention. These and others were passed on to the officials concerned, and the manner of their acceptance of this information to our mind demonstrated the willingness to do all they could to make the organisation as efficient as possible.

Without a doubt the work of speedy Rehousing and Post-Raid Social Welfare is one of the greatest factors in maintaining morale. It deals with the people immediately following the destruction of their homes, and the ultimate influence of the impression that is created in the minds of the affected public is considerable. If the work of this Post-Raid Social Welfare had to break down, the psychological reaction would be disastrous.

Every effort put forward in this direction is a great contribution towards the maintenance of public morale and from this angle, deserves special mention.

FIRE-WATCHING - MORALE BYE-PRODUCT

An extremely interesting psychological study was observed, relating to the effect of fire-watching. In one working class district, a rather large fire seriously endangered almost the whole street of small houses. Fire-Watchers in the vicinity, supplemented by a great number of residents, rendered very useful work.

This is mentioned not merely to draw attention to the work of fire-watchers, but to illustrate a rather interesting and perhaps important fact that despite the terrifying experience to which the residents had been subject during the raid, the following morning we found that the topic of conversation was not “the terror” but “the job” they had done. Because they had the opportunity of doing something during the raid, it was perhaps responsible for keeping their mind off the more terrifying aspects of the bombing.

This is perhaps a “morale maintenance” by-product of Mr. Herbert Morrison's Fire-Watching Scheme.

EFFECT ON SERVICES

Over a rather large area the gas was cut off for some days, causing rather considerable inconvenience. In several places road communications were interfered with, but certainly not seriously. Telephones were naturally down in many quarters, but there was by no means a cessation or abnormal dislocation of transport and communications. The people accepted the inconvenience of the absence of gas, with extreme good humour. This certainly had no adverse influence at all upon people's morale or temper.

The Communal Feeding Organisation certainly responded to the need created by the loss of individual means of cooking.

POST-RAID SERVICES

These services operated under difficult conditions, and on the whole the manner in which they responded is deserving of commendation. We did however receive one or two complaints of minor breakdowns, which we pass on with a view to constructive criticism.

In one case, it was learned there appeared to be no contact with one centre and another, apparently there was no telephone communication, and no messenger services operated. There were rather a large number of persons who visited the St. Mary's centre because of an unexploded bomb. When they arrived the officials apparently did not know where to send the evacuees. They were then directed to Park Road, from there to Middleton Street, and then on to All Saints. As the people were walking it was obviously creative of some dissatisfaction.

It is realised that alternative accommodation during any raid might suddenly be called into use, but we would suggest that rapid and alternative means of communication be made available, so that those in charge of centres, will be fully alive as to the position elsewhere.

From our investigations we find that temporary district offices are certainly not successful. It appears to be difficult for people to learn quickly the place to which they should report. This presents special difficulties for people who are desirous of making their own arrangements. Such persons are expected to inform the authorities, yet the difficulty of knowing where to report presents something of a problem.

We found that on more than one occasion, responsible persons such as wardens did not appear to be as fully alive to information concerning facilities available, for Post-Raid Welfare.

We appreciate that many persons who did not make immediate contact with the authorities were themselves to blame, yet we do feel that something more could be done to make it possible for these services to be brought more quickly to the notice of affected persons, when an emergency arises.

In the King's Hall during the morning following the raid, there was a large number of persons making application for Emergency Food Cards. According to information received, the staff were unable to deal with these people that morning, and this resulted in some dissatisfaction.

At the Y.P.I. Centre for some reason or other, no breakfast was available until very late in the morning, approaching lunch time. This was apparently due to the fact that those responsible for the Feeding Services had not been kept fully informed. This is rather difficult to understand and it is even more inexplicable that emergency food was not drawn from the Cafe Premises, for such could without a doubt have been replaced.

These are some of the difficulties that were brought to our notice. They must be regarded as isolated incidents, and are not intended to be taken as a general reflection upon the efficiency of the organisation, but as an indication of the need for constant revision and examination of the organisation, in the light of practical application.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MORALE

This report covers three severe raids, one of which was on such a scale as to merit the description of a “blitz”. Shock was certainly felt in the hours immediately following these raids and some districts stood up to the attacks better than others, but there can be no doubt at all that public morale following these three severe attacks remains high and unimpaired.

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REFERENCES

1. Northern Region (Newcastle) Weekly reports from R.I.Os.
2. North-Eastern Region (Leeds)
3. North-Midland Region (Nottingham)
4. Eastern Region (Cambridge)
5. London Region (London)
5x Special London reports.
6. Southern Region (Reading)
7. South Western Region (Bristol)
8. Wales (Cardiff)
9. Midland Region (Birmingham)
10. North-Western Region (Manchester)
11. Scotland (Edinburgh)
12. South-Eastern Region (Tunbridge Wells)
13. Northern Ireland (Belfast)
14. Special reports from R.I.Os.
15. M.O.I. speakers' reports
16. Local Information Committees' reports
17. Home Press Summaries M.O.I.
18. Regional Press Summaries
19. Hansard
20. Postal Censorship
21. Telephone Censorship
22. Police duty-room reports
23. Mass Observation
24. War-time Social Survey
25. B.B.C. listener research papers
26. B.B.C. special papers
27. Citizens' Advice Bureaux
28. W.V.S.
29. Scottish Unionist Whip's reports
30. Liberal Party reports
31. Economic League's reports
32. W.H. Smith's questionaires
33. War Office Postbag summaries
34. Primary sources

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